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Abstract 
 
The position that holds that virtue, as a good, is sufficient for happiness has had 
illustrious exponents in the past. We will refer to this position as the sufficiency thesis. 
In recent times however this position has fallen into disfavour. This is largely due to the 
strong intuition that certain goods other than virtue are necessary for happiness. We 
will refer to this as the problem of external goods. The point of this paper is to respond 
to the problem of external goods by articulating an understanding of virtue as involving 
the ability to occupy a “distanced perspective” within which the virtuous agent becomes 
detached from external goods insofar as he comes to view them as indifferent. My 
articulation of this understanding of virtue will be based upon what I take to be the core 
of the Stoic description of virtue.  
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Introduction 
 
 
What I discovered is that happiness is not something that happens. It is not the result of 
good fortune or random choice. It is not something that money can buy or power can 
command. It does not depend on outside events but rather on how we interpret them. 
Happiness, in fact, is a condition that must be prepared for, cultivated, and defended 
privately by each person. People who learn to control inner experience will be able to 
determine the quality of their lives, which is as close as any one of us can come to being 
happy.1  
Much has been written on the nature of happiness. As we will see the precise nature of 
happiness is a contentious issue. Happiness like any object of philosophical inquiry is hard to 
pin down. However, despite the difficulties understanding the precise nature of happiness 
there is less disagreement about its value. We all seem to seek happiness. Given the apparent 
universality of the pursuit of happiness it is clearly seen by the majority to be constitutive of 
what we take to be a good life; happiness is for many a central feature of a good human life. 
In line with the ancient traditions I am in fact convinced that happiness is the central 
requirement for a good human life and it is primarily for this reason that I have become 
interested in the concept. 
The difficulties and contention surrounding happiness has a lot to do with the ambiguity of 
the term “happiness”. Given this ambiguity it is necessary to clarify what is meant by 
happiness and briefly survey the philosophical landscape before we can embark on any 
meaningful investigation into it. Broadly speaking the term “happiness” has at least two 
significantly different senses. The first sense of the term uses the word as a purely descriptive 
psychological term. The other sense of the term is roughly synonymous with well-being or 
human flourishing.2  
Now, “happiness” in the first sense is a purely psychological matter and is fundamentally 
concerned with certain states of mind. Happiness in this sense is a certain state of mind. It is 
very often this sense of happiness people have in mind when they talk of “being happy”. 
                                                          
1 Csikszentmihalyi (1992: 2)  
2 Haybron (2011) 
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Similarly when we say that so-and-so “is happy” we seem to be making reference to a state of 
mind that they are in. Happiness in this sense is a property possessed by people who are in a 
positive state of mind.3 As to the question concerning what state of mind happiness actually 
is, there are numerous possible answers. There are for example life satisfaction accounts of 
happiness which identify happiness in one way or another with a positive attitude towards, or 
judgment of one’s life as a whole.4 Other affect-based accounts stress the affective element of 
happiness. Examples of affect-based accounts of happiness are hedonism and emotional state 
views.5 
For the purposes of this paper we are going to avoid the contemporary debates on the nature 
of happiness in its first sense, leaving this question open. What I concerned with in this paper 
is happiness in its second sense, i.e. happiness in the sense of well-being. Happiness in the 
sense of well-being is a kind of value; more specifically it is a prudential value. Well-being is 
what is good for a person insofar as their life is going well for them. It is what benefits a 
person, makes her better off, or is desirable for her for her sake.6 . It should be noted here 
that, in the remained of this paper, I use the term happiness as synonymous with “well-
being”, unless otherwise specified.  
The question which naturally arises in relation to well being is: what is good for a person? 
There are numerous possible answers to this question. In the first instance, some accounts of 
happiness identify it with happiness as a state of mind, or happiness in the first sense. Welfare 
hedonism is an example of such an account of happiness according to which happiness 
consists in a greater balance of pleasures over pains.7 The intuitive idea behind welfare 
hedonism is that what seems good to a person surely must be good for them and since 
pleasure seems good to people it surely must be good for them.8 Some theorists have rejected 
hedonism in favour of some kind of desire theory according to which desire-satisfaction is 
what matters for happiness.9 
                                                          
3 Haybron (2011) 
4 For authors who have defended some version of the life satisfaction account see Almeder (2000) and McFall 
(1989) 
5 For a recent defence of hedonism see Feldman (2010).  For a defence of an emotional state view see Sizer 
(2010). 
6 Haybron (2011) 
7 For a defence of welfare hedonism see Mill (2010). 
8 Crisp (2013) 
9 Crisp (2013) 
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Both hedonism and the desire-satisfaction accounts have advantages but also have significant 
difficulties. It is not at present necessary to spend time discussing the advantages and 
difficulties of these accounts as they are only mentioned in order to get a sense of the 
philosophical landscape. The account of happiness I am going to be working with in the 
remained of this paper is most naturally referred to as an objective list account. Objective list 
accounts are most commonly understood as theories which list items constituting happiness 
that consist neither in pleasurable experience nor in desire-satisfaction. Such items might 
include things such as friendship, knowledge, virtue, etc.10 The central challenge for any 
objective list account involves determining what should go on the list and what should be left 
off it. It is clear that everything that is good for a person must be included on the list. Insofar 
as I am concerned with what happiness is and prefer an objective list account, the primary 
task in this paper is to determine what things are good for a person such that they should be 
included on the list.  
My preference for an objective list account of well being is a result of my interest in ancient 
ethical theory and the tendency found there to think of happiness in terms of parts and 
wholes. This seems to me to be a natural and helpful way of thinking about happiness. 
Ancient ethics was highly concerned with happiness, which is one possible translation of 
“eudaimonia”, the word used by the ancient traditions. The central question in ancient ethics 
was the question “which life is best for one?”11 Ancient ethics went so far as to endorse what 
Vlastos12 terms the “eudaimonist axiom”, which is the claim that happiness13 is the ultimate 
end of all rational activity, including virtue. We see this commitment in Aristotle who 
understands well-being to be a self-sufficient good, the possession of which makes life 
choice-worthy and lacking in nothing [1097b10-15]. Epicureanism is similarly committed to 
the eudaimonist axiom, as is illustrated by their reference to happiness as the “final and 
ultimate good” [On Ends I. 29]. Other notable philosophers who endorsed the axiom included 
the likes of Socrates and Plato.14 Happiness then is to be understood as a practical good 
(insofar as it is a prudential value) of ultimate significance, it is the final good which is itself 
constituted by some other good, or plurality of goods if that be the case. 
                                                          
10 Crisp (2013) 
11 Parry (2014) 
12Vlastos (1991: 203) 
13 In the sense of well-being 
14 Vlastos (1991: 203) 
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It is worth noting that there have been note-worthy philosophers who have denied the 
eudaimonist axiom. Most notably Immanuel Kant, who took both morality and happiness to 
be essential for the good life, but maintained that morality trumps happiness.15 The obvious 
concern that sits behind Kant’s denial of the eudaimonist axiom is that it fails to recognise the 
value of morality. Ancient philosophical traditions did however find a central significance for 
moral value by incorporating virtue into their understanding of eudaimonia or happiness.16 I 
am not going to spend time defending the eudaimonist axiom as doing so does not further the 
dialectic of the paper but note that it is an implicit assumption of the tradition with which this 
paper primarily engages.  
What I am fundamentally concerned with in this paper is the intimate connection, seen in the 
ancient traditions, between happiness and virtue. Happiness (eudaimonia) can be described as 
consisting in the possession of the good. Virtue (arête) for its part seems to me to be the 
prime candidate for such a good. The plausibility of such a connection between eudaimonia 
and arête becomes apparent when we translate “eudaimonia” as living well. Ancient 
philosophers thought that there are certain characteristic activities that are associated with 
human living. There is an intuitive plausibility to the idea that to carry out the 
characteristically human activities well or in accordance with human excellence, is to be 
living well and hence to be eudaimon or to have a good life, to be well off.17 Thus virtue 
(arête) is that which is to be possessed/attained in order for one to live well and hence be 
happy (eudaimon).  
We see this connection between arête and eudaimonia exploited in Aristotle’s function 
argument, which employs the concept of the ergon of man. Roughly the ergon of man is the 
proper function appropriate to a human being qua human being [1097b25-30]. Aristotle 
identifies the ergon of man as a being-at-work in accordance with reason [1098a5-10]. This, 
along with the principle of being that the good of any thing is to be found in its functioning 
well according to its proper function, allows Aristotle to identify rational activity of the soul 
in conformity with excellence or virtue as the good of human beings [1098a15-18]. Happiness 
or eudaimonia then for Aristotle, as for the majority of the ancient schools, is intimately 
                                                          
15 Kant (2005) 
16 Parry (2014). A notable exception were the Cyrenaics who granted very little to no value to virtue whilst 
maintaining the eudaimonist axiom, see also Parry (2014). 
17 Parry (2014) 
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connected to virtue, which is the good of the human being, such that we have the good of the 
human being as good for a human being.  
In keeping with my engagement with the ancient traditions I am committed to the view that 
virtue and happiness are intimately connected, as we see in the ancient traditions. Connecting 
virtue to happiness is however not a straightforward exercise. There are numerous ways in 
which we can flesh out the link between virtue and happiness. One way is the view 
expounded by the Epicureans. The Epicureans were hedonists and as such maintained that 
human happiness is constituted by a pleasant state of mind.18 Even given their commitment to 
hedonism, as well as their commitment to the eudaimonist axiom, the epicureans still found a 
central role for virtue. Without going into details, Epicureanism achieved this by taking well-
being to be freedom from pain such that the pleasures of the happy life are the subtle 
pleasures of merely being.19 Virtue plays an indispensible role in this account because it is 
only through virtue that the subtle pleasures of being can be appreciated. In the Letter to 
Menoeceus Epicurus asserts that virtue and happiness are inseparable and that living a 
virtuous life is the necessary and sufficient means to the pleasure that constitutes happiness 
[Letter to Menoeceus, 132]. According to Epicureanism the pleasant life and the virtuous life 
coincide insofar as virtue is the only means to the pleasant life; it is the sole source of 
happiness.  
As should be clear, the Epicureans did not take virtue to be a constituent or component of 
happiness, they rather took it to be the source of happiness which was thought to be 
constituted by the subtle pleasures of being. This means then that, for the Epicureans, virtue 
(arête) is not a good whose possession constitutes happiness. Rather it is a good the 
possession of which produces the good that once possessed constitutes happiness, where this 
good consists in the subtle pleasures of being. Virtue is thus an instrumental good and 
nothing more. I do not favour this kind of connection between virtue and happiness. 
Practically speaking however I do not think there is a significant difference between holding 
that virtue is a source of happiness rather than holding that it is a constituent of happiness. 
The distinction between goods as sources and goods as constituents of happiness is 
significant as a theoretical distinction and plays a role in distinguishing kinds of goods and 
                                                          
18 Parry (2014) 
19 Parry (2014) 
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how their possession benefits us. It is still the case that, in relation to virtue, the theoretical 
distinction lacks practical import because fundamentally both have it that virtue is productive 
of a certain way of being, which is identifiable as happiness.20 Whether virtue constitutes that 
way of being or merely produces it is not such a significant question.  
This being said, I do prefer the sort of view that makes virtue a constituent of well-being 
rather than a source of it.  This is down to the fact that I am uncomfortable with the idea of 
ascribing mere instrumental value to virtue even though, practically speaking, virtue as a 
source and virtue as a constituent should produce the same sort of life, namely a life in 
accordance with virtue. Leaving this aside, there are numerous possible ways in which we 
could maintain that virtue is a constituent of well-being. In order to get a more precise handle 
on the view I aim to defend we can lay out three distinct theses, the necessity thesis, the 
sufficiency thesis and the identity thesis, each of which stipulate a distinct understanding of 
how it is that virtue constitutes happiness. 
 
The necessity thesis maintains that virtue is a necessary element in happiness. According to 
the necessity thesis, the happy person is necessarily a virtuous person. The claim that virtue is 
a necessary element in happiness does not imply that the virtuous person is happy. There may 
be other components which are also needed for happiness. Priam is an example here. Though 
he was a good man he was allegedly reduced to misery by the events that accompanied the 
fall of Troy.21  
The sufficiency thesis on the other hand maintains that virtue is a good which is, in itself, 
sufficient for happiness. Happiness is in need of no other good, either as a source to confer 
benefits not conferred by virtue or as a component in happiness alongside virtue. A 
consequence of this is that the happiness of one who has attained to full virtue is immune 
from misfortunes. So long as a misfortune does not affect his virtue then it cannot affect his 
happiness. The sufficiency thesis is a stronger position than the necessity thesis as it runs 
more sharply against most people’s intuitions. The notion that the happiness of a good person 
is immune to misfortune will strike most as counter-intuitive and hence implausible. We may 
                                                          
20 For a discussion of this issue see Hadot (2002); Hadot (1995) 
21 We will look at this example again in the discussion of Aristotle in the next chapter. Aristotle considers the 
example of Priam at 1100a5-9. 
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once again refer to the example of Priam. Common sense tells us that no matter how good 
Priam was we would not call him happy after becoming aware of his horrifying fate. The 
strongest position of all would be the identity thesis which will maintain that virtue is both 
necessary and sufficient for happiness. This means to say that virtue is a necessary element in 
happiness, and in fact, the only element required for happiness. 
The thesis I aim to defend in this paper is the sufficiency thesis. I find there is a definite 
plausibility to the identity thesis because I am of the opinion that, along with the sufficiency 
thesis, the necessity thesis is also plausible. I am however going to leave aside the question as 
to whether we should accept the necessity thesis. A defence of the necessity thesis will 
involve ruling out all logically possible constituents of happiness, such as the possibility that 
happiness can be conferred by God as a gift or whatever, which is a project I am not 
concerned at present with undertaking.22 Doing so would involve justifying the answer “no” 
to the question of whether we can be happy without virtue. It is worth noting that Aristotle’s 
function argument serves this end. In any case, the question we are going to concern 
ourselves with is the question of whether virtue, as a good, is sufficient for happiness, leaving 
aside the question as to whether happiness could possibly be constituted by some other good 
or goods. We may state the question in the following way: Can we plausibly maintain that 
one who has attained to full virtue is in need of no other goods, either as a source or as a 
component in happiness, so that the happiness of such a person is thus immune to 
misfortune? 
My aim in this paper is to defend the sufficiency thesis by way of justifying the answer “yes” 
to the question stated above. Two points are worth expounding to clarify the sufficiency 
thesis. The first is that happiness is no longer identifiable with happiness as a state of mind. If 
the sufficiency thesis is correct, then happiness as a state of mind or experiential state is not 
an essential constituent of happiness in the sense of well-being. According to the sufficiency 
thesis it is virtue and not a pleasant state of mind that is good for a human being.23 The 
second point is that the sufficiency thesis makes happiness an exclusively psychological 
                                                          
22 Noteworthy defences of the necessity thesis include that offered by Plato in the Republic as well as the 
defence offered by Aristotle in the Nicomachean ethics. We will consider Aristotle’s views in the next chapter 
but not in order to mount a defence for the necessity thesis but rather to provide theoretical substance to the 
problem posed by external goods which we will consider shortly. 
23 As we will see this is not to say that a pleasant state of mind is irrelevant for happiness, just that it cannot be 
analysed independently of the possession of virtue. 
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good, that is, a good of the soul. Virtue is a psychological good and if virtue is the sole 
constituent of happiness then happiness is also exclusively a good of the soul. Happiness is 
independent of any external goods whatsoever. 
There are concerns which may arise in relation to both of these points. In relation to the first a 
concern may arise in the vein that the sufficiency thesis fails to recognise the centrality of a 
pleasant state of mind for happiness. We may re-iterate the intuition that what seems good to 
a person must be good for them. One may feel that the sufficiency thesis fails to recognise 
this.  
This is not however a significant concern for the sufficiency thesis. We see in Aristotle the 
idea that virtue is a highly pleasant condition [1099a8-21]. As we shall see, the Stoics also 
take virtue to involve a certain form of pleasantness, more specifically the Stoics take virtue 
to be accompanied by a joyous tranquillity,24 which forms part of the sage’s ease with all 
outcomes. In the main, it seems that this concern arises out of the preference for the idea that 
what seems good to us must be good for us. Denying that what seems good to us must be 
good for us does not entail the claim that happiness as a state of mind is irrelevant. We can 
still place significance on a pleasant state of mind by maintaining that what is good for us 
must seem good to us, i.e. what is good for must be productive of a pleasant state of mind. 
This for my part is the more plausible manner of construing the relation between seeming 
good and actually being good.  
There is a much more serious concern for the sufficiency thesis which arises in relation to the 
second of the two points noted above. The concern that arises is that the sufficiency thesis 
fails to recognise the role external goods play in happiness. In book I of the Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle raises the concern of external goods by pointing out that the happy person 
does not appear to be someone who is altogether ugly, disease ridden, low-born, child-less, 
has children who are bad, or suffers the loss of loved one’s [1099a30–1099b10]. The 
substantive concern is that external goods confer benefit onto a person independently of 
virtue. They can do this either as a source of some good that is independent of virtue, perhaps 
                                                          
24 It is worth noting that this is a similar state to the one the Epicureans identify with happiness. The core 
difference between Epicureanism and Stoicism is that the Epicureans relegate virtue to the status of a source 
of happiness. The Stoics, like the Epicureans, definitely take pleasure and emotions, as contemporary 
hedonists and emotional-state theories understand them, to be vicious. For the Stoics this is because they are 
thought to result from mistakenly judging indifferents to be good which is vice. Parry (2014) 
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insofar as they are required for the presence of a certain pleasantness that cannot be acquired 
or sustained by virtue alone, or perhaps as a component in happiness as we may perhaps see 
in the case of health where being healthy is in and of itself good for a person independently of 
any benefit it may confer. People who may feel comfortable with the idea that virtue is a part 
of happiness, insofar as it is good for people, will refrain from committing themselves to the 
idea of excluding external goods. We have a very strong intuition that being in a good state of 
health, having a loving family, having sufficient wealth, being a respected member of society, 
etc. are all good for a person and their absence is bad for a person and so people are naturally 
inclined to think that they should be included in any plausible account of happiness.  
The remained of this paper is in fact framed around a response to this second concern for the 
sufficiency thesis, which is explicitly raised by Aristotle in book I of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. The Stoics address the problem of external goods raised by Aristotle. The Stoics 
explicitly maintained that the only thing required for happiness is virtue by denying that 
external goods are good for us at all.25 According to the Stoics, health, beauty, strength, good 
reputation, wealth, etc. are neither good nor bad, they are indifferent. The only thing that is 
truly good is virtue [On Ends III. 36].26 
Now it seems we have to maintain something like the Stoic position if we are going to 
successfully defend the sufficiency thesis.  As it turns out I find the heart of the Stoic position 
to be substantially plausible. The heart of the Stoic position seems to be the idea that the 
ostensible end of our action (which invariably consists in attaining indifferents) can be 
pursued without being desired and happiness can be located solely in the pursuit. Cicero 
doubts the coherence of this possibility claiming that the Stoic doctrine on indifferents cannot 
allow for action in the world. To pursue something, according to Cicero, is to take it as good 
,and hence we must be committed to the claim that the indifferents are good for us, and hence 
should form part of happiness (On Ends IV. 69-74).  
In defence of the Stoics on this count is their doctrine that certain indifferents are to be 
preferred over other indifferents on the basis that human beings are naturally inclined to 
pursue them.  Stoicism thus does not council complete indifference towards the indifferents. 
                                                          
25 Parry (2014) 
26 We may note that whether or not saying this also involves a commitment to the necessity thesis is not a 
question I am going to consider, once again for the reason that the necessity thesis and its plausibility is a 
question I am leaving aside. 
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It rather counsels a sort of distancing of one-self from the things one pursues, making the 
pursuit the purpose and not the things themselves. Cicero was aware of this strategy but again 
thought that it is not coherent. He in fact seems to think that the Stoics say that indifferents 
are neither good nor bad, but practically and for all intents and purposes don’t actually mean 
that indifferents are neither good nor bad, because saying they are preferred is just an obscure 
way of saying they are good [On Ends IV. 69-74]. I am convinced however that Cicero fails 
to recognise that, phenomenologically speaking, there does indeed seem to be a substantial 
difference between pursuing indifferents as good, and pursuing them as indifferent but 
preferred. The point that Cicero fails to recognise is that even though attaining indifferents 
may be the ostensible end of the action, i.e. the reason that would be given to explain the 
action, it need not be the formal end of one’s action. The formal end of one’s action may be 
virtuous activity, at the same time as indifferents form the ostensible ends of one’s action.  
The heart of the Stoic doctrine seems to consist in recognising and exploiting this distinction. 
One is to try everything in one’s power to attain preferred indifferents but not make actually 
attaining them the formal goal of one’s pursuit. At its core Stoicism councils a shift from the 
goal of actually attaining indifferents to the goal of trying everything in one’s power to attain 
them, and virtue manifests in the latter. As Cicero puts the point, indifferents “are ‘to be 
chosen’ but not ‘to be desired’” [On Ends III. 22].27 Virtue for the Stoics consists in seeking 
indifferents guided by right reason. Thus the formal goal of the virtuous agent must be the 
seeking in accordance with right reason. This means that for the Stoics virtue and hence 
happiness28 consists in the way we pursue indifferents, and not actually in whether or not we 
attain them. Virtue paradoxically consists in pursuing virtue in one’s pursuit of indifferents. 
As an existential point I find this idea to be substantially plausible and substantially 
significant. We see in the Stoic attitude towards indifferents a form of detachment and it is in 
this detachment that we can come to see the plausibility of the sufficiency thesis. This 
detachment, which is an essential feature of Stoic virtue, can be shown to constitute an ease 
with all outcomes and hence can be shown to constitute happiness, where this happiness is in 
need of no other goods. Given the intuitive plausibility of this it is in fact rather bemusing to 
                                                          
27 Cicero actually makes this point as a point about the art of archery but it is meant to illustrate the relation 
between virtue and the indifferents. 
28 As Parry (2014) notes, the Stoic conception of happiness is a bit discordant with the common ways of 
thinking about happiness but it is in no way idiosyncratic. We will explore the Stoic conception of happiness in 
greater detail in chapter 2. 
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me that the Stoic position is often viewed more as an interesting oddity than a viable ethical 
option. One possible reason for this is found in the fact that the Stoic understanding of the 
virtuous agent is completely alien to our modern way of thinking.  This is in no way helped 
by the fact that it is seen to rely upon the doctrine of divine providence, which is no doubt a 
metaphysical doctrine which will have few contemporary philosophical supporters. Virtue is 
defined by the Stoics as a “connectedness with Nature”29 and it is in this very definition of 
virtue that we see the employment of divine providence. As we shall see, nature for the Stoics 
is identified with Zeus. According to the Stoics, the universe is governed by right reason that 
pervades everything and is directly responsible for all that is and all that occurs, apart from 
the willing of rational animals. Given that Zeus governs the universe for the good, everything 
happens of necessity and for the overall good. Virtue is understood to involve acting and also 
desiring solely to act in accordance with this divine plan as it were, safe in the knowledge that 
everything that happens, happens for the good.  
Insofar as Stoic ethics is so alien and is seen to rest on divine providence it is understandably 
viewed as an out-dated, yet interesting view. I feel however that a lot can be done to make the 
core of Stoic ethics more palatable to a contemporary audience. In the first instance I feel that 
the insights behind the Stoic description of the virtuous agent can be related to concepts we 
are more familiar with, and hence it can be shown that the Stoic understanding of the virtuous 
agent is in fact not as alien as it might initially appear. Furthermore I think that the core of 
Stoic ethics does not require the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence in any 
conceptually necessary sense. In essence then I am of the opinion that we can maintain the 
core of Stoic ethics whilst substantially diminishing the role played by its controversial 
metaphysics.  
How this is to be achieved is by coming to recognise that the Stoic definition of virtue has 
both existential and metaphysical components. The notion of connectedness has to do with, at 
least, the sage’s ease with all outcomes. This state of connectedness is a state of virtue. But 
this means that there is room to distinguish the conception of virtue, at least logically, from 
its metaphysical presuppositions. We shall see that the state of connectedness involves the 
capacity to become detached from indifferents, that is, see them as indifferent and hence as 
irrelevant for our happiness. Virtue then involves the capacity to occupy a “distanced 
                                                          
29 Parry (2014) 
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perspective” which renders the happiness of the virtuous agent immune to even the greatest 
of misfortunes. 
The distanced perspective is to be understood as a psychological stance which involves a 
suspension of the practical standpoint in which our diverse desires for things such as health, 
wealth, friendship, etc. govern our experience and engagement with the world. The distanced 
perspective is a perspective from which our engagement with and experience of the world is 
not defined by these diverse desires we may be subject to, it is in essence a transcendence of 
a sort. The distanced perspective is to be understood as the psychological standpoint of 
contemplation where the capacity to adopt this psychological standpoint in any situation is a 
component of virtue. Since this psychological standpoint allows the one who adopts it to 
view indifferents as indifferent, it renders the agent’s happiness immune to misfortune and in 
need of no other goods beyond virtue. It is constitutive of an ease with all outcomes and a 
tranquil and stable joy that is free from the requirement for any and all goods other than 
virtue.  
The core of my project then is to offer an interpretation of the Stoical project that does not 
rely in any conceptual sense on Stoic metaphysics. This is to be achieved by describing virtue 
as involving the insertion of distance where this distance renders the happiness of the virtuous 
agent immune. I feel that the defence of the sufficiency thesis hinges on the plausibility of 
this distanced perspective which is thought to accompany virtue.  
The dialectic of this paper is going to be the following. Given that the substantial problem 
faced by the sufficiency thesis is the problem of external goods, I am going to start by 
considering an inclusive interpretation of Aristotle. What I hope to achieve by considering 
Aristotle is to provide some theoretical substance to the intuition that sits behind the problem 
of external goods, by giving an account of virtue that leaves space for external goods. This 
will leave us in a good position to recognise how it is that an account of virtue should go 
about excluding external goods. Once this has been achieved I will consider the Stoic answer 
to the question of external goods and see how it is that their account of virtue excludes them 
from happiness. I will then move on to the project of making the core of the Stoic answer 
more palatable by relating it to the distanced perspective.  
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By way of responding to objections, I am going to consider and respond to the objection 
which I find most pressing. This objection comes in the form of the concern that occupying 
the distanced perspective involves a certain form of misrepresentation of the world. The 
distanced perspective involves a mutation of one’s experience of events such that one is at 
ease with what would otherwise be horrifying events. This is the manner in which virtue 
insulates the virtuous agent from the requirement for external goods and renders his 
happiness immune to the possibility of misfortune. The natural concern arises here that the 
distanced perspective involves a certain disconnection from the world, which is a world in 
which bad things happen. How is it, some may ask, that the virtuous agent can rationally be at 
ease with events that contain great evil? Are we to maintain that by adopting the distanced 
perspective the virtuous agent comes to see evils as good, and hence comes to misrepresent 
the world? 
I have to admit here that this paper is limited in scope. This is because I am not going to have 
the space to articulate a full account of virtue. A detailed discussion of the virtues of action 
for example is conspicuous in its absence. I will also not have the space to respond to many 
of the objections that occur to me as worthy of a response. My ambitions are relatively 
humble. I aim only to articulate an understanding of the essence of Stoic virtue that entails 
the sufficiency thesis in a manner that seems plausible. I accept that I will be leaving more 
questions unanswered than those that have been answered.  
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I. Aristotle 
 
The formal objective of this paper is to explore an account of virtue which renders the 
sufficiency thesis plausible. As was noted in the introduction, the most significant challenge 
faced by the sufficiency thesis is that posed by external goods. The objective of this chapter is 
the formulation of a theoretical justification for recognising the existence of external goods. 
This will be achieved by exploring a possible account of virtue that leaves space for external 
goods. This will progress the dialectic of the paper and furnish us with a better understanding 
of what needs to be achieved in order to render the sufficiency thesis plausible.  
The account we are going to explore is the inclusive interpretation of the Aristotelian account 
of the relation between happiness and external goods.30 The view we are going to explore is 
the view that virtue is a dominant part of happiness and the most choice-worthy of all the 
goods. Crucially however the things that the Stoics call preferred indifferents are also seen as 
necessary for happiness such that complete happiness is dependent on the possession of these 
goods.31 It is this latter claim that constitutes the substantial challenge to the sufficiency 
thesis. I should just note here that the point of this chapter is not to come to an accurate 
representation of Aristotle’s account. Rather it is to get a sense of a possible account of virtue 
that leaves room for external goods, thereby giving theoretical substance to the intuition 
behind the problem of external goods. In order to make sense of this construal of Aristotle’s 
position it is necessary that we have a general understanding of Aristotle’s conception of 
happiness and his conception of virtue. We can then explore where external goods might fit 
into this picture.   
Aristotle starts the Nicomachean Ethics with an examination of the good and of happiness as 
the final good. It thus makes sense to start with a discussion of Aristotle’s thoughts on 
happiness then move on to discuss virtue. In the discussion of happiness that will follow we 
will see clearly how Aristotle builds virtue into happiness as a constituent element of 
happiness with the use of his notorious function argument. Aristotle’s conception of virtue 
                                                          
30 For a discussion of the inclusive interpretation of Aristotle see Crisp (1994). 
31 We may note that the matter is slightly complex as it is in fact not entirely clear whether Aristotle in fact 
thinks that the happiness of the virtuous person can be limited in the manner in which it would be if external 
goods were thought to be constituent parts of happiness. We will return to this point in the last section of this 
chapter. 
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kind of falls out of the function argument so discussing happiness first is conceptually 
preferable. Once we have discussed happiness and virtue we can turn to the question of 
whether virtue is sufficient for happiness and identify the reasons for thinking that it is not.  
 
1.1 Happiness 
 
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics with a consideration of the good. Aristotle is here 
concerned with coming to understand happiness (eudaimonia), where this is taken to refer to 
the type of life which is best, or most worthwhile, or most desirable.32 Aristotle tells us there 
that “the good has been well defined as that at which all things aim” [1094a1-5]. As was 
noted in the introduction, happiness for Aristotle is understood as the final good or the 
highest good. Happiness/eudaimonia is the good which is “responsible for the being good of 
all these things” [1095a15-25]. Happiness/eudaimonia is to be understood as constituting the 
best possible life.  
That happiness is this ultimate good is shown by the fact that we always choose happiness for 
itself and never as a means to something else [1097b1-5]. It is also shown by the apparent 
fact that happiness is a self-sufficient good. A thing is understood as self-sufficient if it in 
itself makes life desirable and deficient in nothing, in other words if it is complete. Happiness 
seems to be the good which on its own makes life desirable and all other goods are sought in 
relation to happiness [1097b5-20]. Happiness then is the good which completes a human life. 
To achieve happiness is to bring a human life to completion such that the life is lacking in 
nothing.  
For happiness to be the completion of a human life it must include within itself, as 
constituents of the complete good, all the things that are good for a human being. These 
constituents will be pursued on account of themselves and also on account of happiness 
insofar as they constitute happiness. Happiness however will be pursued for no further reason 
since there is no other good for which it can be pursued; it is complete and lacking in nothing. 
                                                          
32 Ackrill (1973) 
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We see here Aristotle’s commitment to the eudaimonist axiom and also what appears to be a 
commitment to an objective list account of happiness. 
A more informative account of what happiness consists of is however required. What are the 
goods that bring a human life to completion such that it is lacking in nothing? In order to 
provide an account of his own Aristotle notes that the goodness for man (or any-thing for that 
matter) is determined by his/its proper function or ergon [1097b25-30]. Aristotle’s point is 
that in order to understand what constitutes our happiness we must understand who/what we 
are. This is Aristotle’s function argument which establishes that the good which brings a life 
to completion is excellence in carrying out the characteristic activities of the soul. 
So what is the characteristic function of man? In order to determine the true function of man 
it is necessary to identify the function which is unique to man, that function which sets man 
apart from everything else that is. We must identify the characteristic activity which defines 
what it is to be human.33 Aristotle identifies, as the ergon of man, the activity of the rational 
element in man. This is said to consist of two parts, (1) one part obeys and is persuaded by 
reason and the other (2) possesses reason and thinks things through [1098a1-5].34 It is worth 
noting that the ergon is an activity and not a latent capacity. When discussing the ergon of 
man Aristotle refers to the ergon of man as a particular form of energeia or being-at-work 
[1098a5-6]. So Aristotle notes that if man were to have a proper function: “the proper 
function of man... consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle or, 
at least, not without it”35 [1098a5-10]. So for Aristotle we find that the characteristic function 
of a human being is activity of the soul in accordance with reason. As we will see more 
clearly in the next section, the proviso “or, at least, not without it” is required in order to 
include the functioning of the part of the soul that listens to reason as part of the ergon of 
man. So it seems we can specify that the ergon of man is to reason, both about action and 
about fundamental principles, but also to feel and desire which are activities of the soul that 
are not without reason.  
Now surely if the function of a harpist is to play the harp, then the function of a good harpist 
is to play the harp well or excellently. Aristotle thinks the same must be true of a human 
                                                          
33 Nagel (1972: 253)  
34 This partition of the soul has significant consequence, as we will see in the later sections of this chapter. 
35 As we will see in the next section, this proviso “at least not without it” is required to include the functioning 
of the appetitive part of the soul as part of the ergon of man.  
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being. If the function of man includes activities of the soul in accordance with reason, then 
the function of a good man is to carry out the activities of the soul in accordance with reason 
well or excellently. A good human being is to reason well, both about action (and hence to 
desire and feel in the right way) and about fundamental principles. Aristotle explicitly 
identifies this rational activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue as the good 
of human beings [1098a15-18]. So the human good is to be understood as rational activity of 
the soul in accordance with virtue36 since the ergon of man consists in “being-at-work of the 
soul and actions that go along with reason” [1198a10-15] and each way of being-at-work is 
only accomplished well when it is done in accordance with the virtue appropriate to it. What 
allows Aristotle to make this identification is the principle that the good of any thing is to be 
found in its functioning well according to its proper function. Happiness is at this point 
identified with the human good. Happiness is here defined as an “activity of the soul in 
accord with virtue” [1098a16-17].    
 
1.2 Virtue 
 
Aristotle, as with other ancient philosophical traditions, views virtue as a certain perfection of 
our rationality. Aristotle’s account of virtue kind of falls out of the function argument insofar 
as it is an articulation of what precisely constitutes excellence with regards to the activities of 
the soul that involve reason [1098a5-10].37 We noted above that excellence in the activities of 
the soul that involve reason should also be thought to include the moral virtues, or the virtues 
which relate to feeling and desiring. Aristotle distinguishes between virtues which pertain to 
thinking and others which pertain to character [1103a10-13]. Aristotle has in mind the 
distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues. We see here that for Aristotle virtue 
is broader than the moral virtues. In order to properly understand Aristotle’s account of virtue 
it is necessary to understand each in turn and their relation to each other.  
Aristotle tells us that a virtue is a characteristic (hexis) that renders good the thing of which it 
is a virtue, and causes it to perform its function excellently [1106a14-16]. As I said, Aristotle 
                                                          
36 A more detailed account of virtue will be given in the next section. 
37 Kraut (2014) 
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distinguishes between intellectual virtues and the moral virtues. Within the intellectual virtues 
however there is one which is practical and the other which is theoretical in nature. 
Aristotle’s distinction between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues, as well as his 
distinction between a practical and theoretical virtue of the intellect is grounded in his 
partitioning of the soul. It seems that the possibility of including external goods lies within 
this partitioning of the soul we see in Aristotle and the distinction between virtue in its 
practical application and virtue in its theoretical application that this partitioning gives rise to. 
Let us outline the partition of the soul in greater detail. As we noted in the previous section 
the soul is thought by Aristotle to have two elements, one rational and the other irrational 
[1102a25-30]. The irrational element has two parts. One is the vegetative part which we share 
with all living things and does not partake in reason in any way. The other part of the 
irrational element is the seat of the appetites, desire, as well as emotions such as fear or anger 
and does partake of reason.38 This part of the irrational element of the soul is recognised 
through its tendency to oppose and react against the rational element. It may however accept 
the leadership of reason in a virtuous man or in a self-controlled man.  
To say this irrational part of the soul may partake of reason means we must introduce 
subdivisions into the rational element of the soul. So Aristotle tells us that one part of the 
rational element possesses reason in the strict sense, contained in itself, and the other possess 
it in the sense of having the capacity to listen to reason as one may listen to ones parents 
[1103a2-4]. At 1098a4-6 Aristotle first introduces the partition within the rational soul. He 
says there that it is the part of our soul that puts into action that part of us that has “articulate 
speech”. This is the rational element and it has two parts: “one aspect is what is able to be 
persuaded by reason, while the other is what has reason and is able to think things through.” 
So we see that the irrational part that listens to reason corresponds with the upper part of the 
irrational soul and the lower part of the rational soul. The functioning of reason in the upper 
part of the irrational element of the soul is practical whereas the functioning of reason in the 
part that possesses reason in itself is theoretical/contemplative. The upper part of the 
irrational element is thought to be responsive to reason when reason “turns its gaze 
downwards” to deliberate about action. 
                                                          
38 It may be the case that the irrational element that listens to reason should be separated yet again into two 
parts. Becoming explicitly clear on this matter is not however necessary insofar as we can get away with a 
rough description. 
23 
 
For present purposes I am going to suppose that the Aristotelian partition of the soul breaks 
the soul up into three parts.39 The first of course is the vegetative part which does not partake 
in reason in any way. The second is the irrational part which does partake in reason but does 
not possess it in itself, rather it is responsive to reason; in a sense reason “occupies” the 
irrational part to deliberate about action. Lastly there is the rational part of the soul which 
possesses reason in itself and the characteristic function of this part of the soul is 
contemplation. As we will see, this partitioning of the soul, and consequent distinction 
between practical and theoretical virtue contains the possibility of including external goods as 
necessary for happiness. 
Now there are no virtues corresponding to the vegetative part of the soul. Both the irrational 
part of the soul and the rational part of the soul however have virtues which are proper to 
them. We see in Aristotle’s partition of the soul the grounds for his distinction between the 
intellectual virtues and the moral virtues, as well as the distinction between the practical 
versus theoretical virtues of the intellect. Now since the appetitive part of the soul has 
characteristic activities that are both appetitive and rational, it contains within itself both the 
moral virtues and an intellectual virtue which is peculiar to it. The intellectual virtue that is 
peculiar to the lower part of the rational soul is phronesis or practical wisdom which is 
excellence with regards to the practical functioning of reason. Aristotle understands phronesis 
as a matter of excellence in deliberation about action. The intellectual virtue of phronesis 
then is concerned with thought as it pertains to action. Phronesis and the moral virtues are so 
closely related to each other that it is sometimes not clear in what manner they are distinct.  
Aristotle defines a moral virtue as an “active condition that makes one apt at choosing... 
which is determined by the proportion and by the means by which a person with practical 
judgment [phronesis] would determine it” [1106b30-1107a5]. In other words moral virtue is 
concerned with desiring and feeling in the manner prescribed by phronesis. It is a matter of 
the irrational element of the soul being responsive to good reason. So phronesis is the 
intellectual virtue that belongs to the part of the soul in which we find the moral virtues, it is 
the intellectual virtue that governs the moral virtues or the ways of feeling and desiring that 
                                                          
39 It is worth noting that the precise nature of the partition is not exactly clear in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
There is reason to believe that the soul should be partitioned into four parts. See Lorenz (2006) for a discussion 
of this topic. What is significant for my purposes is the clean distinction between “higher” and “lower” parts of 
the rational soul. The specific details of how we are meant to understand the lower part is not relevant for the 
current project. 
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are in accordance with right reason. It is the virtue of the intellect employed in its practical 
functions.  
It is not currently necessary to map out the entirety of the relation between phronesis and the 
moral virtues. We may just note that the moral virtues consist in the selection of the mean 
between the two extremes of excess and deficiency. Where the mean lies in any given 
situation is for a person of phronesis to determine [1106b30-1107a5]. A moral virtue then is a 
hexis involving desiring and feeling in the manner a person with phronesis determines. What 
is essential to understand about the moral virtues and phronesis is that they are centrally 
concerned with which among ends is good for a human being. Aristotle in fact defines 
phronesis as “a truth-disclosing active condition involving reason, concerned with what is 
good and bad for a human being” [1140b1-10]. We are to desire only those things that are 
good and ensure that our feelings are directed appropriately, for example we should fear only 
those things that are fearful or bad and only to the degree to which they are fearful or bad.  
So we see that the virtues proper to the irrational part of the soul include both the moral 
virtues and phronesis and they are concerned with desiring and feeling in the right way, such 
that we pursue only that which is good for a human being and avoid only that which is bad. It 
is this understanding of phronesis that I feel leaves room for the inclusion of external goods, 
more on this in the next section. For now I just note that the upper part of the rational soul 
also has an intellectual virtue that is peculiar to itself. The intellectual virtue of the upper part 
of the rational soul is sophia or theoretical wisdom, which is concerned with thought as it is 
directed to the fundamental principles and causes of the natural world, or things which are 
incapable of being otherwise, and it is the pure functioning of reason. We can see then that 
intellectual virtues are the virtues which pertain to thinking, phronesis as it is directed 
“downwards” towards action and sophia as it is directed “upwards” towards fundamental 
principles. The moral virtues are the virtues which pertain to character and are concerned 
with excellence in desiring and feeling.  
 
1.3 Connection between Virtue and Happiness 
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Now we come to a consideration of external goods, and why Aristotle might have thought 
they constitute happiness. Aristotle does mention explicitly at 1099a32-33 that happiness 
needs goods other than virtue. Here he first lists two. Firstly he tells us that certain actions 
cannot be performed without the assistance of instruments such as power, wealth, friends, etc. 
[1099a34-35]. These are goods which are required for the being-at-work in accordance with 
virtue and so are necessary for one to achieve the human good. We shall refer to these goods 
by the phrase “instrumental goods”. Without these goods we will not be able to fully realise 
our capacity to act in conformity with virtue and as such be unable to fully realise the human 
good. We may also include into the considerations here goods that are required for the 
development of virtue, for without goods such as a good upbringing and a stable society we 
will not be able to develop into the sorts of beings who are able to act in accordance with 
virtue. I will refer to these with the phrase “developmental goods”. We see here that in both 
cases, i.e. cases where goods are instrumentally required and cases where goods are 
developmentally required, goods other than virtue are required to enable us to achieve virtue.  
We can immediately take both developmental goods and instrumental goods off the table 
because they do not present a challenge to the sufficiency thesis. The person without either 
developmental or instrumental goods won’t acquire, or exhibit virtue. This can be accepted. It 
is no counterexample to the sufficiency thesis because it is not a case in which a virtuous 
person is not happy. Both developmental goods and instrumental goods can only be 
understood as having an indirect impact on happiness because they are, for different reasons, 
a source of virtue. This again is not a problem for the sufficiency thesis. For external goods to 
pose a problem for the sufficiency thesis it has to be the case that they are directly relevant 
for happiness.  
So of the two types of goods other than virtue, namely instrumental goods and developmental 
goods, neither present a challenge to the sufficiency thesis. The only goods other than virtue 
that present a direct challenge to the sufficiency thesis are what we shall refer to as 
“intrinsically good gifts of fortune” and it is these goods to which I refer when I use the term 
“external goods”. Aristotle tells us at 1099b2-4 that there are certain goods the absence of 
which spoils happiness. 40 
                                                          
40 We may note that the absence of these goods cannot make a virtuous person wretched, they can only limit 
the happiness of the virtuous person. As Aristotle tells us: “[and] since it is activities that control life, as we 
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Further, deprivation of certain [external goods] - for instance, good birth, good 
children, beauty - mars our blessedness. For we do not altogether have the character 
of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solitary, or childless; and we 
have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad, or were good 
but have died [1099b1-6]. 
Aristotle also rather comically tells us at 1099a4-5 that a very ugly man cannot be classified 
as a truly blessed man.41 At 1100a5-9 Aristotle uses the legend of Priam to illustrate the 
point. Priam, who was a very good king to his people, suffered the sacking of his city, 
endured the horror of witnessing his son murdered and his wife raped and enslaved, only to 
be murdered himself. The example of Priam seems to show that no matter how prosperous 
and good a man was/is; if he meets a tragic and wretched end, his cannot rightly be called a 
blessed and fully happy life. 
It seems that the strongest reason for acknowledging the existence of external goods is that 
doing so bears the full force of common sense. There are countless examples, both fictional 
and historical, that the defender of common sense can draw on to substantiate their point, the 
fate of Priam is just one such example.  
wWhat seems clear is that we desire external goods and in so doing treat them as good. 
Acknowledging external goods then is clearly our pre-theoretical base-line, simply because 
we desire them. It is in any case clear that Aristotle acknowledges external goods because 
doing so captures a strong intuition. Aristotle in fact seems to present the point about external 
goods as a sort of truism.42 Aristotle writes of someone who has suffered an immense 
misfortune, like that of Priam, that “no-one counts him happy” [1100a9]. Also, at 1153b21 
Aristotle states that those who claim that the good man is happy even on the rack or when 
great misfortunes befall him are “talking nonsense”. He goes so far as to state that a person 
would only count such a man happy in order to “defend a philosopher’s paradox” [1096a1-2].    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
said, no blessed person could ever become miserable, since he will never do hateful and base actions” 
[1100b33]. 
41 We see here the distinction between blessedness and happiness. Staying true to his identification of 
happiness with the human good, Aristotle terms the good that includes both the human good and external 
goods “blessedness”. This different terminology must not however detract from the fact that the inclusion of 
external goods as good means that virtue in and of itself is not sufficient to complete happiness understood as 
a complete and self-sufficient good. 
42 Elliot (2014: 45) 
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It is this intuition and its intuitive strength that I take to constitute the substantial obstacle for 
the sufficiency thesis. The question still remains however as to why this intuition does not 
contradict Aristotle’s account of virtue and hence why an account of virtue may leave room 
for external goods. I am of the view that an account of virtue only leaves room for external 
goods if it acknowledges the legitimacy of the desire for them. Let us explore this possibility. 
By so doing we can give some theoretical substance to the intuition that external goods 
contribute to our happiness. This will give us a better sense of the obstacle which stands in 
the way of the plausibility of the sufficiency thesis. So how should we understand Aristotle’s 
account such that it leaves room for external goods? As I have previously indicated, the 
answer I think can be found in Aristotle’s partitioning of the soul. We have seen that Aristotle 
partitions the soul into the vegetative, irrational and rational parts. The irrational part, the part 
that merely listens to reason, has both the moral virtues and phronesis which are proper to it, 
whereas the rational part has sophia which is proper to it.  
Now we said that happiness for Aristotle is identified with “activity of the soul in accord with 
virtue” [1098a16-17]. Now each part of the soul has a virtue that is proper to it. The irrational 
part of the soul has excellence in desiring and feeling43 (the moral virtues) as well as 
excellence in practical thought (phronesis). The rational part of the soul has contemplation 
(sophia) which is proper to it. Since each part of the soul has a virtue or excellence which is 
proper to it, it seems that each part of the soul has a good which is proper to it. What we must 
be careful to recognise here is that it is essential for the excellence of the irrational part of the 
soul that the things, the external goods, it pursues are good, insofar as they are in accordance 
with phronesis, which is the excellence in choosing among ends. I remind the reader that 
Aristotle defines phronesis as “a truth-disclosing active condition involving reason, 
concerned with what is good and bad for a human being” [1140b1-10]. It is therefore implicit 
that the good of the irrational part of the soul involves treating external goods as good. 
Phronesis is the intellectual virtue which makes one able to recognise what amongst ends are 
good and hence rightly desired. To say that they are rightly desired is to say that they are 
good insofar as desiring something involves treating them as good. 
                                                          
43 There is a question here as to where the desire to know fits into this equation. It seems wrong to analyse the 
desire to know as of the irrational soul. Man desires to know only insofar as he is rational so the desire to 
know surely finds its seat in the rational part of the soul. The desire to know, i.e. to attain to wisdom, is the 
striving of the rational part of the soul to attain to the virtue which is proper to it, namely sophia.  
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But what are these external goods good for? Surely the answer is that they are good for that 
part of ourselves which rightly desires them. In other words, if external goods are to be 
directly relevant for happiness in any degree then they must be thought to form part of the 
good of the irrational part of the soul. This would mean that external goods are good for the 
man of action, which is a man whose existence finds its excellence in phronesis and the 
moral virtues.44 The good of the irrational part of the soul is the good proper to the practical 
man who is concerned with pursuing what is good and to the degree to which it is good, 
within the public arena.45 It makes substantial sense to think that the good of the man of 
action should include actually attaining those things which he rightly desires and pursues. We 
see then that if external goods are going to find a place as necessary for happiness it will have 
to be as a necessary condition for the good of the irrational part of the soul. We can offer an 
example of this. Food is good for us because the nutritive part of the soul needs food, i.e. 
rightly desires food. Similarly with all other external goods, they are good for us insofar as 
they are good for the irrational part of the soul (or perhaps the nutritive part of the soul) 
insofar as they are needed/rightly desired by that part of the soul.46  
It must be said that such an interpretation of Aristotle, where we maintain that external goods 
are good for the irrational part of the soul, in the sense that they confer benefit independent of 
virtue, faces significant interpretive difficulties. In the first instance it is puzzling, given 
Aristotle’s definition of happiness as an “activity of the soul in accord with virtue” [1098a16-
17], as to why Aristotle would actually include external goods as part the good of even the 
irrational part of the soul. Aristotle’s initial definition of happiness seems to be incompatible 
with acknowledging the existence of external goods which contribute to happiness.47 There is 
also the problem that Aristotle clearly suggests that the vicious are altogether miserable 
[1100b33-1101a1]. Richard Kraut states the problem thus:  
Suppose happiness consisted in a variety of goods, and not just in virtuous activity. 
Then misery, the opposite of happiness, would consist in the opposites of those goods. 
For example, if happiness consisted in a balance of virtuous activity, physical 
                                                          
44 If we are to agree with Elliot and also Kraut then we would think that even this is inconsistent with 
Aristotle’s views. See Elliot (2014: 44-53); Kraut (1989: 261) 
45 See Parry (2014) 
46 It is not clear where precisely friendship and the love for one’s child fit into this picture. I am however going 
to leave this question aside. 
47 Elliot (2014: 44) 
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pleasure, power, and wealth, then a completely unhappy person would be 
impoverished, powerless, full of vice and pain, and devoid of pleasure. Now those 
whose strongest desires are for amusements or power or wealth stand a decent chance 
of getting some of these goods to some degree. At any rate, Aristotle would have to 
admit that so long as one has some of the other goods (besides virtuous activity) in 
which happiness consists, one will, like the virtuous person who has suffered great 
misfortune, fall between the two extremes of happiness and misery. 48 
Lets us leave these interpretive difficulties aside. In any case, external goods surely cannot 
find a place within the rational part of the soul. The rational part of the soul has excellence in 
speculative thought, sophia, which is proper to it. The thought of the purely rational part of 
the soul is contemplative; it gazes “upwards” to understand fundamental principles and 
strives towards the divine. If there is an end to be attained from the activity of contemplation 
it does not consist in any external good, rather it will consist in knowledge of divine truths. 
The rational part of the soul in any case cannot be thought to desire any external good and 
hence cannot be thought to require any external good to supplement its good. This good of 
the rational part of the soul, which consists in contemplation of the more divine aspects of 
being, is the good proper to the man of contemplation, and it cannot be thought to require 
external goods in any sense. 
So we have these two goods, the good of the practical man and the good of the man of 
contemplation and it is only in the former that external goods can find a place.49 The question 
now is: how are these goods related to happiness? Now if external goods are to pose a 
challenge to the sufficiency thesis, we have to maintain that happiness is constituted by both 
the good of the irrational part of the soul and the good of the rational part of the soul, hence 
we refer to this as an “inclusive” interpretation of Aristotle. A simple way of saying this is 
that part of what it means to be human is for external goods to be good for us. It seems to me 
that this is precisely what the inclusive interpretation maintains. This just means that the 
virtue that constitutes happiness is compatible with desiring external goods and hence treating 
them as good such that they can rightly be deemed as necessary for happiness. In other words 
                                                          
48 Kraut (1989: 261) 
49 Whether or not one should include phronesis as part of the good of the rational part of the soul is not of 
great significance. I include it as part of the good of the irrational soul because it is fundamentally concerned 
with practical thought which is concerned with excellence in choosing among ends. It, so to speak looks 
downwards. 
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it is consistent with virtue to desire external goods and insofar as we rightly desire them, they 
are necessary for our happiness. We may note that it will never be possible, even on the 
inclusive interpretation, for a virtuous person, grossly cursed by fate, to be wretched. This is 
because external goods are only necessary for a small part of the good of the lower part of 
ourselves. Nevertheless they can limit the happiness of the virtuous person because they are 
necessary insofar as they are necessary for the good of the irrational part of the soul.  
So I have outlined a theoretical justification for including external goods as necessary for 
happiness. I have essentially opened a space in an account of virtue for external goods. They 
are good for us insofar as they are good for the part of our souls which rightly desires them.50 
One should recognise that the space has been opened by maintaining that it is in accordance 
with the virtue that constitutes happiness to rightly desire external goods and hence treat them 
as good. We may note that there are things Aristotle says in book X that cast doubt on this 
inclusive interpretation. In book X Aristotle says that if happiness is activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue then it will be activity in accordance with the highest virtue, which is 
sophia. Again sophia belongs to the highest part of the soul, the intellect or rational part of 
the soul, which is the part of the soul which governs and is closest to the divine [1177a10-
20]. So Aristotle seems to be saying that happiness is constituted by the good of the intellect 
or the rational part of the soul. He suggests that the life of contemplation, which is the life 
that participates in the good of the rational part of the soul, is secure against the need for 
external goods [1177a30]. If we accept this dominant interpretation of Aristotle which 
maintains that happiness is constituted by the good of the intellect, then we will have to 
conclude that Aristotle actually endorses the sufficiency thesis because happiness is secure 
against the need for external goods and is constituted solely by sophia.51   
Now, my aim in this paper is clearly not to take a position in an interpretive dispute. My aim 
is to render the sufficiency thesis plausible. We may remind ourselves that the most 
prominent obstacle to the plausibility of the sufficiency thesis is the strong intuition behind 
the existence of external goods. We desire external goods and in desiring them we treat them 
as good. Placing value in external goods then is our pre-theoretical base-line. The above 
                                                          
50 Note this is not anything like an orthodox desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, see Crisp (2013). External 
goods are to be objectively specified in accordance with phronesis, they are not subjectively defined as they 
would be on an orthodox desire-satisfaction theory.  
51 See Hardie (1965) for a discussion of the dominant interpretation of Aristotle. 
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discussion of Aristotle has been dialectically useful since we now have some theoretical 
substance to the intuition that external goods contribute to happiness. External goods are 
good for us insofar as they are good for the part of us that rightly desires them. This just 
means to say that virtue is consistent with desiring external goods and hence treating them as 
good. If this is the substantial challenge to the sufficiency thesis then I feel the best defence to 
mount against it is to attempt to show that virtue involves detaching oneself from, or 
“purifying” oneself of these desires for external goods to attain to an existential position of 
invulnerable happiness. This can perhaps be formulated as the claim that our happiness 
consists in detaching from or “rising above” that part of ourselves which rightly desires 
external goods, which would be Aristotle’s view if we accepted the dominant interpretation.  
To this end I am going to move the spotlight of this investigation onto the Stoics. The Stoic 
response in essence denies that there is a part of ourselves at all for which external goods are 
good. As we will see the Stoics deny the Aristotelian partitioning of the soul and instead 
analyse desires and feelings as involving a rational assent to some indifferent as good.52 The 
good of the soul then is seen to be solely constituted by virtue, which is the perfection of the 
rational part of our soul, and there is no place to be found for external goods as there is no 
part of the soul which rightly desires them and so there is not part of the soul for which they 
are good. Again, this is the line of response I aim to adopt. Essentially I am going to argue 
that external goods are not good for us at all because happiness consists in the divestment of 
all desire for them. In chapter 3 I will argue that this position can be rendered plausible by 
examining the existential position occupied by one who has detached themselves in such a 
manner. This will culminate in a description of wisdom as involving a distanced perspective 
which renders the agent’s happiness invulnerable. I will thereby have answered the 
substantial challenge to the sufficiency thesis by showing that virtue and hence happiness is 
constituted by the existential position in which external goods are no longer desired and are 
experienced as indifferent and hence are irrelevant for happiness. 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Inwood (1985) 
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II. The Stoics 
 
My defence of the sufficiency thesis is going to be formulated around a response to the 
problem of external goods raised in the last chapter. More precisely it is going to be 
formulated around a response to the inclusive interpretation of Aristotle which maintains that 
external goods can limit the happiness of the virtuous person insofar as desiring them is 
consistent with the possession of virtue. My goal ultimately is to present an account of virtue 
such that the possession of virtue transforms our relationship to external goods. This 
transformation is perhaps best referred to as a transcendence or “shedding” of our “lower” 
natures, which secures the virtuous agent’s happiness against the requirement for external 
goods, and diffuses the problem of external goods as posed in the previous chapter.  
The present chapter begins this project by describing the Stoic answer to the problem of 
external goods, and providing the theoretical essentials that enable this answer to be given. 
Ultimately, my final position diverges from the Stoic account with regards to the 
metaphysical doctrine of divine providence. Even given this divergence I will maintain what I 
take to be the core of the Stoic insight. In this chapter then I aim to distil the Stoic position 
and identify the commitments I would like to keep and those I would like to set aside.  
Before undertaking this endeavour it is worth noting that the Stoic school is made up of a 
diverse set of often seemingly contradictory doctrines and no complete corpus survives 
today.53 Thus the literature on Stoic thought seems to involve piecing together fragments. 
Given this uncertainty around Stoic thought I am going to avoid getting lost in interpretive 
details and internal disputes. My aim is to provide the bare bones of how I understand the 
Stoic ethical doctrine. I aim to outline what I take to be the central tenets of the Stoic school 
as they are relevant to their ethical views and their endorsement of the sufficiency thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Edelstein (1966) 
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2.1 Virtue 
 
 
The Stoics, like Aristotle, took virtue to consist in the perfection of our rationality, though 
they developed this differently to Aristotle. On the Stoic account virtue is a psychologically 
much simpler affair than it is for Aristotle. In Aristotle we see room for distinct but inter-
connected virtues in the soul, namely; sophia, phronesis, and the moral virtues. In Stoic 
doctrine however there is only room for one sort of virtue, that consisting in a well-trained 
mind that is able to recognise all the actual good reasons for or against certain actions, 
interests, commitments, activities and ways of living.54 Virtue for the Stoics consists in the 
ability to select rationally between things which are natural but indifferent55 with respect to 
human happiness.56 As we will see, virtue for the Stoics is a unity constituted by wisdom and 
all the other virtues such as courage, temperance, etc. are accounted for in terms of different 
domains of application of wisdom.  
The simplification of virtue is a consequence of the Stoics’ moral psychology.57 Unlike 
Aristotle, and indeed Plato, the Stoics do not partition the soul into rational and non-rational 
elements.58 We see in Aristotle desires and emotions as non-rational drives in the soul that 
can, in and of themselves, move us to action. The Stoic view is radically different. Desires 
according to the Stoics are not analysed as non-rational; they are the result of rational assent 
to pre-rational feelings, which are aimed towards indifferents, as good.59 What Aristotle and 
Plato call the appetites (active desires moving us to bodily gratification through eating, 
drinking, or sexual activity) are, according to the Stoics, a particular kind of thought, a 
thought which is a rational assent to a pre-rational feeling of hunger or thirst as good and 
                                                          
54 Cooper (2012: 161) 
55 The standing of the indifferents will be considered in section 3 of this chapter. 
56 Inwood (1985: 206) 
57 We may note however that it is not entirely dependent on it. I am however going to leave the question of 
moral psychology open because I do not feel it is the most pressing issue I need to consider. The moral 
psychology of the Stoics is considered here in order to develop their position. Suffice to say that full virtue 
involves overcoming our desires for indifferents. Being committed to this does not in itself commit us to the 
Stoic moral psychology.  
58 Cooper (2012: 158) 
59 We will explore this is greater detail in the next section. 
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worth pursuing.60 These pre-rational feelings do not amount to another part of the soul, at 
least not in the Aristotelian sense, because they cannot in and of themselves move us to act. 
The Stoics go so far as to maintain that all emotions (which can in and of themselves move us 
to act), including desire, fear, pleasure, and pain are in fact vicious because they all 
essentially involve the judgment of some indifferent thing as good and as such are 
incorporated within the singular rational part of the soul. 
As is evidenced by the Stoic view that all desires and emotions are vicious,61 the Stoics 
maintained that external goods are not good at all but are rather indifferent. We see that Stoic 
virtue is clearly inconsistent with desiring external goods. The only thing that is good and the 
only thing that should be desired is virtue. Everything other than virtue is neither good nor 
bad and should be treated as such [On Ends III. 10]. The Stoics argue for the indifference of 
things such as health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, etc. by noting that these things can 
be used well or badly. The good according to the Stoics is invariably good and because of this 
these assets fail to be good, they are neither good nor bad.62  
As I illustrated in the introduction however, the indifferents were thought to possess some 
sort of value. 
That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else 
that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount 
of positive value... this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may 
translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 
'valueless.' [On Ends III. 20] 
So for example, health, as an indifferent, was thought to be naturally preferred such that the 
virtuous person is to seek health and avoid illness, even though actually being healthy does 
not in any way contribute to a person’s happiness. Indifferents are in fact seen by the Stoics 
to provide the raw materials for virtue. Chrysippus described virtue as a craft/art (techne) 
having to do with the things of life [Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta II 909]. Virtue for the 
Stoics is the mastery of the art of living in the world. The mastery of the art of living in the 
                                                          
60 Cooper (2012: 159-160) 
61 Presumably all of the various vices such as gluttony, cowardice, etc. are to be analysed in terms of the 
presence of various desires and emotions. All vice is however of one kind, all vice is constituted by the same 
sort of failing, namely treating some indifferent thing as good. 
62 Parry (2014) 
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world involved knowledge of what is good, bad and indifferent and desiring only that which 
is good. It is for this reason that the Stoics identify virtue with phronesis. Phronesis as we 
saw in Aristotle is practical wisdom, otherwise known as prudence. Put roughly, it is the 
ability to knowingly select, and pursue that which is of value and desire that which is good. 
Remember that for the Stoics things of value (preferred indifferents) are not good. It is only 
virtue that is good. Things of value are to be pursued, or in Cicero’s language “to be chosen” 
[On Ends III. 22], but not to be desired. Virtue alone is to be desired. 
The individual virtues, such as wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance (which are for the 
Stoics are the cardinal virtues with wisdom being the virtue within which the others are 
unified), were to be a certain sort of disposition, which accrue from knowledge of what is 
good, bad and indifferent. Virtues were called (diatheseis) and differ from ordinary 
dispositions (hexis) in that they do not admit of degree. The Stoics thought that virtuous 
action/response, or perfectly appropriate action/response,63 involves a particularly stable and 
consistent disposition.64 Any appropriate action has the potential to be virtuous. A response 
becomes virtuous, or perfectly appropriate if it is done by a sage, from the appropriate 
diatheseis. This means then that it is done with full knowledge of what is good, bad and 
indifferent. To act with the appropriate diastheseis is, at least in part, to act in the full 
knowledge that virtue is the only good. This means that the ultimate standard of goodness is 
not merely responding in a conventionally just, courageous or temperate manner; it is so 
responding because it is judged to be the virtuous response.65 A response is only virtuous then 
when it is done for the sake of virtue, and from the stable disposition to desire only virtue. 
Virtue is the only thing that is truly good - so for an action to share in the goodness of virtue 
it must be done for the sake of virtue.  
We see then that acting in the world for the sage consists in the pursuit of indifferents as 
indifferent and for the sake of virtue. Having mastered the art of living, the Stoic sage has 
knowledge of the manner in which indifferents are to be appropriately pursued.66 The sage is 
                                                          
63 A perfectly appropriate action/response differs from merely appropriate action/respond, which is just 
understood as the right thing to do or the right way to respond. Perfectly appropriate action (the virtuous 
response) is the right thing to do done in the right way, from a stable and consistent disposition. 
64 Inwood (1985: 208-209) 
65 We see here why Kant may be interpreted as in some sense Stoical. See Kant (2005) 
66 As we shall see, it is because the knowledge of what is appropriate is incomplete that the sage is to pursue 
indifferents with reservation. 
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to ensure at all times that the course of action to which he assents is in accordance with right 
reason. The sage alone is able to act as right reason dictates and thus only he knows what 
pursuit is appropriate; but he also knows that success in the pursuit is irrelevant - what 
matters is that the pursuit is correctly judged to be appropriate and is undertaken solely for 
the sake of living virtuously. The Stoic sage is to select and pursue indifferent things with 
reservation67 purely because attaining them is not his formal goal as he desires only virtue. 
We can see more clearly now what is meant when we say that the wisdom of the sage is 
constituted by phronesis, or the ability to knowingly select, and pursue that which is of value, 
and desire that which is good. 
This Stoic understanding of virtue is greatly illuminated by the analogy drawn by the Stoics 
between virtue and the art of archery [On Ends III. 22]: A skilled archer should concern 
himself with practicing the art of archery excellently, i.e. he must attend to his stance, draw, 
sight profile, release procedure, etc. and ensure he gets all these things right. Whether or not 
the archer manages to hit the target is dependent upon factors that are external to the archer. 
Something might come in between the arrow’s trajectory and the target, the target might 
move, some force may affect the flight of the arrow. As such the target is only relevant as a 
facilitator of the techniques of archery; it provides the raw materials for the practice of 
archery. Furthermore, it is only through such deliberate attention paid to the actions involved 
in archery that one can master the art of archery. Virtue, similarly to archery, is about a 
virtuous way of being and not about producing or realising a particular result, even if it may 
be considered appropriate. What is significant is that the sage recognises what course of 
action is appropriate (the virtuous/good course of action) and does it for the sake of virtue. 
This is what is in his power, whether or not the action realises in the manner otherwise 
expected is not within the sage’s power, and so is not relevant to the sage’s virtue.  
This is illustrated in the Stoic account of acting with reservation. The Stoics called an impulse 
in pursuit of the good, which will in turn cause the relevant action or pursuit, an orexis.68 An 
orexis involves assent to a proposition of the following form “It is fitting to...” A reserved 
orexis adds the clause “unless it goes against Zeus” such that a reserved orexis involves 
                                                          
67 We will have more to say on what this reservation involves shortly. 
68 The Stoic account and classification of the different types of impulses is pretty complex. For our purposes we 
need only note orexis as it is sufficient for outlining what I take to be the most important aspects of Stoic 
ethics. For a detailed discussion of impulses in Stoicism see appendix 2 in Inwood (1985: 224-242) 
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assent to a proposition of the following form “It is fitting to... unless it goes against the will 
of Zeus.” We see that the Stoics advise that we should act in accordance with the will of 
Zeus.69 This is the formal goal of the Stoic sage. Given that the will of Zeus is not always 
apparent to us however we are to act with reservation, with a reserved orexis. The only thing 
that we are to pursue with an unreserved orexis is virtue.  
We see again in the Stoic account of acting with reservation the view that virtue is constituted 
by excellence in the pursuit of ends. As Cicero puts the point: 
It is of the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with 
nature. [On Ends III. 12] 
Actually attaining the ends of our actions is however irrelevant for virtue. The ends of our 
actions are to be chosen because they are of value but not to be desired because they are not 
good, they are indifferent [On Ends III. 12]. The Stoic sage knows what pursuits are 
appropriate because he knows what ends are of value; he knows what ends are to be chosen. 
He however undertakes the pursuit solely for the sake of virtue because virtue is the only 
good and is the only thing he desires. It is this that I take to be the core of Stoic ethics.  
At its core then virtue for the Stoics is centrally concerned with desiring in the right way. The 
sage is to desire only virtue because to desire anything other than virtue is to treat what is 
indifferent as good, which is vice. The sage is also able to always recognise what course of 
action is required of him by virtue; he knowingly selects and pursues things of value but is 
not invested in attaining them. The wisdom of the sage then is constituted by phronesis. It can 
be described as a detached knowing, or perhaps better a knowing which produces 
detachment.70 It can thus be described as a form of contemplativeness though it perhaps 
differs from the contemplativeness we see in Aristotle insofar it is essentially practical. It is a 
knowing that produces detachment because the sage has knowledge of what is good and what 
is of value where this knowledge sees to it that the sage views indifferents as indifferent and 
hence becomes detached from them. He desires only virtue and does not desire any of the 
indifferents and pursues them only if they are deemed to be of value and hence in accordance 
with virtue. These serve only as the raw materials for virtue.  
                                                          
69 This, as we will see, means acting in accordance with fate which involves acting to bring about the next 
phase of Zeus’s divine plan. 
70 I will have occasion to refer to this description of Stoic wisdom in later chapters. 
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It is important to keep in mind that phronesis for the Stoics is perfected virtue. This differs 
from Aristotle. As Deverette puts the point: 
There is one important difference, however, between the Stoic sophos and the 
Aristotelian phronimos. The Stoic expert is never wrong; his or her knowledge is 
infallible in the sense that it inevitably succeeds in making the sage virtuous and thus 
in bringing happiness.71 
In Aristotle’s view phronesis is a lesser virtue than sophia and is as such deficient. Perfected 
virtue is constituted by sophia and is roughly describable as the state of contemplation. For 
Aristotle, the highest achievement possible for a human being is not constituted by any 
achievement in the practical domain. For one to attain to sophia one must separate oneself 
from the practical sphere and lose one-self in the activity of contemplation. Contemplation 
and action then are mutually exclusive activities of the soul. Stoic phronesis is like its 
Aristotelian cousin insofar as it is essentially practical. Crucially however it differs insofar as 
it is inconsistent with any desire for indifferents and also does not exclude the contemplative 
activities of the soul. Stoic phronesis seems to be a practical contemplativeness.72 The sage is 
pursuing ends in the world but doing so from a contemplative perspective insofar as he is 
detached from those ends. It is practical because it is concerned with the selection of ends in 
the pursuit of virtue. It is contemplative however insofar as it involves a detachment from 
those ends and a concern for cosmic understanding. So, whilst the ends are pursued, they are 
pursued in a manner conducive to contemplation and from the contemplative perspective of 
cosmic understanding as it were.73 We in fact see that there is a sense in which Stoic 
phronesis constitutes a bringing together of the contemplative and practical domains, which 
are held distinct in Aristotle, a bringing together of phronesis and sophia.74 This should be 
expected given their simplified moral psychology. 
                                                          
71 Devettere (2002) 
72 For Aristotle phronesis does not seem to be a form of contemplativeness as it is for the Stoics. 
73 We will get a greater sense of what this might entail in the next section and also in the next chapter. 
74 There is a very interesting question here about the nature of action from a contemplative standpoint. This 
will not be action that is motivated by a desire for the end that would be given as a reason for the action. I am 
of the view that the action of the virtuous agent is a form of autotelic activity in the sense developed by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1992). I am however not going to pursue this question in this paper, even though it is a 
substantially interesting one. 
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It is worth noting that, true to Hellenistic philosophies generally, the perfection of virtue was 
deemed by the Stoics to be almost inaccessible. This state of being constituted by phronesis is 
the goal of every Stoic, though actually attaining it is extremely difficult, and highly unlikely. 
It is for this reason that spiritual exercises were such a crucial element of Stoic philosophy, 
and indeed ancient philosophy in general. As Hadot puts the point:  
With the help of these exercises, we should be able to attain to wisdom; that is, to a 
state of complete liberation from the passions, utter lucidity, knowledge of ourselves 
and of the world. In fact for Plato, Aristotle [in the form of sophia], the Epicureans, 
and the Stoics [in the form of phronesis], such an ideal of human perfection serves to 
define divine perfection, a state by definition inaccessible to man. 75  
The sort of perfection involved in virtue was, for the Stoics, exceptionally difficult if not 
impossible to attain. The knowledge required (of oneself and the world) to always be able to 
recognise the appropriate pursuit, and to undertake it solely for the sake of virtue, was 
thought to be immense, indeed divine. Under normal conditions then what was expected of a 
Stoic was to be absolutely committed to the pursuit of attaining the perfection of the sage. 
“The only state accessible to man is philo-sophia: the love76 of, or progress toward, 
wisdom.”77 This is the state which defines one who is wholeheartedly committed to Stoic 
philosophy. The philosopher was thought to live in the intermediate state between the domain 
of the habitual and everyday and the domain of absolute consciousness and lucidity, which is 
the domain of virtue. To the extent that the philosophical life was inseparable from a life 
devoted to spiritual exercises of the sort described by Hadot,78 the philosophical life 
constituted a deliberate tearing away from the everyday in search of the domain of virtue.  
So, Philo-sophia is not phronesis or perfected virtue as it is envisioned in the sage. This point 
calls to mind the Stoic doctrine that virtue does not come in degrees. This doctrine was 
                                                          
75 Hadot (1995; 103) 
76 The love of the philosopher consists in a deficiency, the philosopher does not possess the wisdom he loves 
and his love is in a sense an expression of this deficiency. This is love in the sense developed in Plato’s 
Symposium. This is not to be confused with the desire for virtue we see in the sage. The sage desires virtue and 
possesses it. Though it is sometimes more natural to express the sage’s desire for virtue by saying that the 
sage “loves virtue”, it is very important to remember that one should not impute from this a deficiency in the 
sage’s virtue similar to the deficiency we see in the philosopher. The sage is not a philosopher; he is higher 
than the philosopher insofar as he possesses virtue and the philosopher doesn’t. 
77 Hadot (1995; 103)  
78 Hador (1995: 81-109) 
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expressed with the use of various metaphors and analogies. One of the metaphors the Stoics 
used was that to drown one foot under water is still to drown.79 This makes it clear that philo-
sophia is something less than virtue. No matter how far along the path an adept may have 
progressed, they will not have attained to virtue in the slightest degree so long as they have 
not attained it in its perfection. Until such a time as a person becomes a sage they will only 
ever have attained to philo-sophia, which is something less than virtue. 
We should not however become uncomfortable here by thinking that Stoicism is unforgiving. 
We must remember that even though the philosopher is not a sage, he is not a non-sage. The 
philosopher is torn between two ways of being. He is torn between the non-philosophical 
domain of everyday life, and the domain of the sage, the domain of utter lucidity and 
knowing detachment.80 The philosopher thus occupies a position between the sage and the 
non-philosopher. He is in a better position than one who has not come to recognise the value 
of virtue, and is blindly pursuing indifferents as good. He is in a better position because he is 
on the path to virtue and hence, as we shall see, on the path to happiness. His is a life of 
inquiry, of himself and of the world. He inquires within himself in order to attain to the 
detachment of the sage, and inquires in the world in order to come to know the things of 
value and the manner in which he should conduct himself. 
 
2.2 Virtue and Stoic Metaphysics. 
 
Stoic ethics is interconnected with metaphysics. It is probably impossible to avoid discussing 
Stoic metaphysics when expounding Stoic ethics; indeed I have already made reference to it 
in the preceding section. Even granting this however there is room for disagreement about the 
precise role Stoic metaphysics plays in their ethics. The most common view stresses that the 
Stoic conception of Zeus and his/its relation to all things has momentous consequences for 
Stoic ethics insofar as it is the philosophical foundation upon which Stoic ethics rests.81 
Conventional wisdom, as expressed by Cooper, has it that the Stoic account of virtue is a 
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80 Hadot (1995: 103) 
81 Cooper (2012: 1) 
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consequence of their metaphysical doctrine of divine providence and is completely dependent 
upon it. The Stoics indeed describe virtue as a harmony with the will of Zeus, or living in 
agreement with nature, a description which involves direct reference to this doctrine. But this 
is not the only way of understanding the Stoic programme. Another less common view has it 
that Stoic metaphysics is not the philosophical foundation of their ethics. Pierre Hadot is 
amongst those who defend this view. 82 Hadot draws attention to the fact that Stoicism was 
first and foremost aimed at achieving a way of life, which constituted the virtuous way of 
being.83 Given that the deliverable of Stoic doctrine generally was the production of a 
specific type of individual, we have reason to believe that Stoic metaphysics is best 
understood as a therapeutic device developed to assist in the ethical project, rather than the 
philosophical foundation of Stoic ethics. I am convinced that the Stoic account of virtue and 
of happiness does not require the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence in any logical 
sense. The Stoic account of virtue as phronesis can stand alone as a defence of the sufficiency 
thesis, without the metaphysical support provided by Stoic metaphysics. In order to show this 
we should first consider the doctrine and the role it plays in the Stoic account of virtue. I will 
only complete my analysis of this point at the end of the chapter once I have considered Stoic 
metaphysics, and the Stoic account of happiness. 
A useful way of starting is by considering man’s relation to the cosmos. Inwood tells us that 
central to Stoic ethics is their understanding of what it is for rational man to act in a 
providentially and rationally ordered universe.84 Virtue for the Stoics, or phronesis, was 
described as living in agreement with nature (phusis) or being in harmony with the will of 
Zeus. The term “nature” here has a very specific meaning. Phusis refers to a rational unity 
governing all things. The Stoics refer to this rational unity as “Zeus”. Zeus is in contact with 
all things; Zeus is present within and not distinct from the natural world; all that exists is a 
part of Zeus.85 Zeus then is actually and actively present in the natural world, and governs it 
according to his teleological thought.86 Zeus exists as an all pervasive force/principle 
responsible for the very being of things, and the occurrence of all events. The Stoic view can 
perhaps be cashed out in numerous ways and there isn’t metaphysical consensus among the 
                                                          
82 Hadot (2002) and Hadot (1992) 
83 This will be developed in greater detail at the end of this chapter and the beginning of the next. 
84 Inwood (1985: 105). We see here again the view that Stoic ethics is a consequence of their metaphysics. 
85 Inwood (2012) 
86 Cooper (2012) 
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Stoics.87 We can however avoid a fine grained discussion of how the Stoic conception of 
nature may best be cashed out as this discussion is not useful for the current project.88  
The crucial moral which we should draw from the Stoic metaphysical story is that it 
constitutes a rejection of the possibility of chance. The rationality and omnipresence of Zeus 
grounds the Stoic’s providential determinism or fate, i.e. their doctrine of divine providence, 
which is a doctrine opposed to the possibility of chance. The Stoic doctrine of divine 
providence can be initially formulated as the following: every event in the natural world is 
determined by the will of Zeus.89 Furthermore, since Zeus, as the active principle determining 
the very being of things, is rational, he is consequently, both in his formative activities of 
giving objects their physical properties, and in causing their subsequent movements, aiming 
at a maximally good product.90 Given that there are no impediments to the rationality of 
Zeus, he succeeds in aiming at, and in realising the maximally complex, well-ordered, and 
integrated, and hence maximally good, life history of the world. So the Stoic doctrine of 
divine providence in its entirety is roughly is the following: Every event in the natural world 
is determined by the will of Zeus in order to realise the maximally well-ordered, complex and 
good whole which constitutes the cosmos.91 
Now, the consequence this metaphysical picture has for us, as beings possessing a limited 
reason92, is that we must aim to act in accordance with the plan laid out by Zeus. We, as parts 
of the maximally good whole sequence of processes and events, are to endeavour to do our 
bit to realize the will or plan of Zeus. Living in agreement with Zeus for human beings then 
means acting in accordance with right reason, such that one wills in a manner that is 
consistent with the divine plan laid out by Zeus. This is what it means for the Stoic sage to 
recognise the appropriate course of action. It is to recognise the course of action that is 
consistent with the will of Zeus, and furthermore to pursue it because it is consistent with the 
will of Zeus. We are seen as partners of Zeus in bringing about the maximally good sequence 
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that constitutes the life history of the world. The good of the world then is the only good we 
are to pursue.93  
We see then that central to being virtuous is the recognition of which action is required of us 
by the will of Zeus, and consequently acting to do our part in bringing about that which is 
deemed to be in agreement with the will of Zeus. Now this recognition of what is in 
agreement with the will of Zeus has a couple of distinct elements. Cooper notes that this state 
has been described by the Stoics both as living in “agreement with nature” and living “in 
accordance with nature”. When the Stoics tell us that we should live “in agreement” and “in 
accordance” with nature, they are not repeating themselves.94 When the Stoics tell us to live 
“in agreement” with nature they seem to be telling us to do two things. Firstly perfectly 
virtuous living involves living in agreement with one-self such that the sage will have no 
divided thoughts about how he is living, and will never be conflicted in his feelings, and 
attitudes about himself, his actions, and his way of life. Living in agreement with nature also 
involves thinking the same thoughts as those of Zeus about one’s current circumstances. 
Living “in accordance with nature” Cooper thinks means living in accordance with the 
natural outcomes themselves. Living in accordance with nature then will be the result of 
living in agreement with nature insofar as one thinks the same thoughts as those of Zeus 
which rule over what happens in the course of nature. This can be understood as acting 
according to normative principles which are derived from the recognition of the proper 
functioning of nature as caused by the thoughts of Zeus.95 Human beings then, as rational 
animals, exist in relation to a divine mind which is actively and causally present in the world 
of nature. Either we act in agreement with it and in accordance with its will or we do not. If 
we do, then we live virtuously, and if we do not, then we live viciously. Both living in 
agreement with and living in accordance with nature are what defines the state of the sage. 
So we see that virtue for the Stoics involves knowledge or wisdom. It involves knowledge or 
wisdom regarding the thoughts of Zeus, and what is naturally appropriate for a human being, 
given their nature and their relation to the things around them. The wisdom of the Stoic sage 
is essentially practical, it involves know-how. It is the knowledge of which among ends is of 
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value and hence to be pursued, and what is good and hence to be desired and, again, it is for 
this reason the Stoics identified virtue with phronesis.  
The wisdom of the sage is a mastery of the art of living which is constituted by an immense 
knowledge of the thoughts of Zeus, and what is naturally appropriate for a human being.96 
The selection of the appropriate course of action will consist in a choice to pursue something 
that the sage judges appropriate for a human being to pursue. The object of the pursuit, 
whether it is eating and drinking to sustain our physical constitution, engaging in games to 
exercise our bodies and mental capacities, developing social relations with other human 
beings, or any of the other appropriate pursuits for a human being, is strictly indifferent, it is 
not the end. The sage will undertake these pursuits because he recognises them to be 
appropriate for him, he will pursue them with reservation as a partner of Zeus, for the end of 
living in agreement with Zeus.97  
We see then that what I identified as the core of Stoic ethics has been described as living in 
agreement with the will of Zeus. It must be said that the core of Stoic ethics does indeed fall 
out of the doctrine of divine providence. If the cosmos is indeed ordained by Zeus to be a 
maximally good whole, then virtue surely must consist in living in agreement with the will of 
Zeus, by doing what is appropriate because it is appropriate, given the will of Zeus. The 
doctrine of divine providence thus certainly necessitates Stoic ethics. It also incentivises the 
wholehearted pursuit of virtue which defines Stoicism as a way of life. One very important 
thing the doctrine of divine providence does do for stoic ethics is that it grounds the 
objectivity of value. Certain indifferents are to be chosen because they are deemed by Zeus to 
be of value, i.e. they are in accordance with nature. The doctrine of divine providence thus 
builds normativity into the world as it were.  
I am however convinced that we do not need the doctrine of divine providence in order to 
ground the objectivity of value. Unless we are moral nihilist, such as John Mackie98 or Alfred 
Ayer99, the idea that normativity is built into the world is highly plausible even if we do not 
posit the doctrine of divine providence. All things considered I am of the view that 
understanding virtue as phronesis in the Stoic manner is sustainable independently of the 
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metaphysical doctrine of divine providence. The Stoic way of life, as defined by philosophia, 
certainly does not require the doctrine of divine providence. Analysed to its most basic, 
philosophia is nothing but a striving for and progression towards wisdom or perfect virtue, 
whatever form that virtue may take. I will return to this once I have discussed the Stoic 
account of happiness. For now it is very important to keep in mind that the Stoic account of 
phronesis as a form of practical contemplativeness is inconsistent with the desire for 
indifferents. To desire so-called external goods is to fail to possess virtue. 
 
2.3 Happiness 
 
I have now outlined the Stoic account of virtue, identified what I take to be their core insight 
which I aim to adopt, and identified the primary doctrine I want to set to one side. In the next 
section I will say more about why I deem it necessary to set aside the doctrine of divine 
providence and also why I am justified in doing so. For now however it is necessary to 
consider the Stoic account of happiness as constituted solely by virtue.  
Stoic ethics espouses a sophisticated conception of eudaimonia or happiness which is the 
constant goal or end for a well-lived human life. The Stoics identify the eudaimon or happy 
life with a life lived in accordance with virtue. In other words, to attain virtue is to have 
attained the good, and so to be happy.100 The virtue in question here is of course phronesis. 
The Stoic account of happiness is one I aim to adopt, though again without committing 
myself to the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence. We will explore its plausibility in 
the next section by examining the characteristic experience of the sage. 
Now, ordinarily we have the tendency to judge the things we possess and acquire, and the 
things which happen to us as good, or good for us at least. The quality of a human life, as 
good or bad, then is understood to essentially depend upon how the life stands in relation to 
these goods. Stoicism takes this ordinary understanding of the goodness of a human life to be 
completely and absolutely mistaken.101 As we saw in the previous section, the Stoics think 
that we should distinguish between things that are appropriately preferred, and what is 
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actually good for us, and worthy of desire. All of the things we ordinarily take to be good are 
only, on the Stoic account, preferred indifferents, and do not in any way add to happiness 
because they are not good.102 The only thing that is good is perfect virtue, or living in 
agreement with the will of Zeus.103 
Now to see why virtue constitutes happiness we must explore the manner in which the Stoics 
developed their account of the good. The Stoics described the goal of human life, or the good, 
in a number of different ways. On one description the good, for the Stoics, is understood as 
apatheia or freedom from passions, where the perfectly virtuous agent is never disturbed by 
events. On another description happiness is seen to consist in homologia, or a consistency of 
reason.104  The different descriptions do not contradict each other, rather they complement 
each other. Apatheia for example was understood by the Stoics as a consistency of reason 
(homologia), such that a freedom from passions is accompanied by a “smooth flow of life”, 
or “living consistently” with oneself and a providentially ordered universe.105 The description 
of the good as homologia is in fact the dominant formulation of the goal of human life and 
was seen to constitute happiness because it was seen to constitute a smooth flow of life.106To 
possess Homologia, as a supreme order and consistency of one’s reason, is to be connected 
with nature. To be connected to nature is to live in agreement with Zeus. As we saw in the 
previous section this state of being is identified with virtue. Let us endeavour to draw out 
why the state of connectedness with Nature or Zeus, understood as homologia and apatheiea, 
can furnish an account of happiness, and identify the core of the account of happiness that 
can be maintained independently of understanding it terms of a connectedness with Nature. 
As we noted in the previous section, to possess virtue is to aim at all times to act in 
accordance to the will of Zeus. The will of Zeus, with regard to any particular agent, is 
comprised by a single set of mutually consistent principles expressing what is appropriate to 
pursue, which define a single set of mutually consistent actions and responses. The sage 
desires to will in accordance with this set of mutually consistent principles, and cannot do 
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otherwise, or perhaps better, cannot want to do otherwise. In other words, living in agreement 
with Zeus means wanting to happen what does in fact happen. The happiness of the sage 
consists in his harmony with Zeus or Nature. The sage is free and happy because nothing 
external to himself ever hinders or impairs him. Such impediments are impossible since the 
sage is at one with the flow of events. This is what the Stoics meant by homologia.107 
Now, as a result of their determinism the Stoics did maintain that the thoughts of Zeus are 
knowable and hence it is possible to act in accordance with his will. The Stoics in fact 
devoted a lot of time to the logical analysis of valid inferences in order to predict the natural 
course of events, so they could follow it with their assent.108 As we saw however, they 
accepted that even the Stoic sage cannot always follow the flow of nature with his assent. In 
some instances it may be appropriate for the sage to pursue an end which is doomed to end in 
misfortune. To account for this they maintained that the sage always acts with reservation. 
This reservation, which I noted in the previous section, ensures that even if the end the action 
aims at, whether it is health, the well being of one’s family, etc. is not realised, one has still 
not willed in contradiction to the will of Zeus. The idea is that the appropriate course of 
action for the sage may ultimately be doomed to fail. This however does not contradict the 
sage’s willing because he judges the pursuit to be appropriate, whilst recognising that Zeus 
may require that the pursuit does not achieve its end. Presumably if the course of action 
chosen by the sage does not achieve its ostensible end, the sage will be aware of why it had to 
fail, such that the sage greets the failure with an understanding of its consistency with the will 
of Zeus. Willing with reservation then enables the ability to adapt smoothly and without 
distress to the otherwise horrifying events that nature has in store for us.109 Thus the stoics 
maintained that even in instances when it is not open to the sage to follow the will of Zeus 
with his assent and hence necessary that he have his pursuits frustrated, he can still greet the 
“frustration” with joy and acceptance, because he recognizes the necessity of the failure.  
At its core then the happiness of the sage seems to consist in his ease with all outcomes. So 
what is truly good is held to be totally within one’s power, and free from the possibility of 
frustration by the functioning of fate. Being at ease with all outcomes is completely within 
one’s power, and dependent solely on the manner in which one is orientated to the world. The 
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sage is at ease with all the eventualities necessitated by fate. What is truly good is understood 
to be virtue or the perfection of one’s soul, the assimilation of one’s reason with that of Zeus. 
This assimilation is the only thing that is to be desired in an unreserved manner. In the event 
that one achieves connectedness with nature, one will be at ease with all outcomes. Virtue 
constitutes the happiness of the sage because virtue constitutes an ease with all outcomes. All 
other things, such as health, the well being of one’s family, etc. are considered appropriate 
and should be pursued with reservation but are irrelevant for happiness. Desiring indifferents 
in fact rules out the possibility of being at ease with all outcomes, and so rules out the 
possibility of being happy. Indifferents can just as easily produce despair as they can produce 
elation, both of which are emotions that are incompatible with virtue, and opposed to 
happiness. We see here, spelled out in black and white, the Stoic endorsement of the 
sufficiency thesis. Virtue constitutes the state of ease with all outcomes, and the ease with all 
outcomes constitutes happiness. 
In this context the Stoic description of the good as apatheia, or freedom from passions, 
makes perfect sense. The passions, which include grief, anger, pity, pleasure, fear, elation 
etc., are a morally wrong kind of impulse.110 Passions were thought to be a kind of impulse 
which included an unnatural disturbance in the soul. This unnatural impulse is caused by a 
judgment that some indifferent thing is good, or, in other words, assent to a proposition 
identifying some particular indifferent thing as good.111 The problem with passions is that 
they were thought to be a kind of excessive impulse, which caused unnatural disturbances in 
the soul, and for this reason are to be dispensed with. 
Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish... 
these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them 
mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free 
from them. [On Ends III. 35] 
Passions arise from a mistaken orexis for non-moral things. Passions are the result of 
mistakenly judging that indifferent things are good. A life free of passions is a life in 
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agreement with, and in accordance with nature. The person who has achieved apatheia is like 
a dog chained to a cart who walks in harmony with the cart. The life of a person who has not 
achieved freedom from his passions is like that of a dog who is chained to a cart but 
consistently wants to go in the opposite direction to the cart, and so gets dragged painfully 
along with the cart. Apatheia then is an alternate description of the state of being at ease with 
all outcomes. 
We thus see in the descriptions of happiness in terms of homologia and apatheia a core 
insight. This insight consists in the idea that virtue can constitute happiness because it is 
constitutive of an ease with all outcomes. This ease with all outcomes was furthermore 
thought to be productive of an experience of tranquillity. This tranquillity is known as 
eupatheia, which is the pleasantness which accrues from virtue. This then is what I take to be 
the core of the Stoic defence of the sufficiency thesis.112 By acquiring virtue he has acquired 
all that is needed to be happy. External goods are neither good nor bad for him, they are 
indifferent. The addition of any indifferent will not add to the sage’s happiness because it will 
not add to his virtue. This then is what I take to be the core of the Stoic defence of the 
sufficiency thesis, and I feel it can be maintained independently of their metaphysical 
doctrine of divine providence. 
 
2.4 Moving Away from Divine Providence 
 
So the Stoics respond to the problem of external goods by denying that they are good at all 
insofar as desiring them is incompatible with virtue and opposed to happiness. The presence 
or absence of these indifferents does not add to nor detract from the happiness of a life 
because they are technically irrelevant for the happiness of a life.113 As has been illustrated in 
the previous sections Stoic ethics is intimately connected with the rest of their philosophy. In 
particular we see their ethical views supported by the metaphysical doctrine of divine 
providence. Again I hope to maintain the core of Stoic ethics, without accepting this doctrine. 
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It should be clear why I want to side-line the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence. One 
will surely be hard pressed to find a contemporary philosopher who accepts it. Given this, 
resting my defence of the sufficiency thesis upon this doctrine will substantially weaken it. 
As I have indicated previously however I am not of the mind that a defence of the sufficiency 
thesis requires the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence. I am in fact convinced that 
Stoic ethics does not require it.  
This possibility in fact is rendered substantially plausible if we note that Stoicism primarily 
was a way of life and their dogmas were therapeutic in nature.114 Given this it seems we have 
the liberty of viewing Stoic doctrine as an elaborate tool for producing greater consistency 
within one’s self, and stability with regards to how one deals with loss and misfortune. It can 
be viewed as a tool to improve our capacity to cope in a world in which our plans often fail. 
Ultimately the aim of the Stoic project can be seen to be the production of individuals who 
are motivated by a moral ideal, which helps them attain greater self-mastery, and control over 
their experience of the world, i.e. the production of virtuous living. We in fact see spiritual 
exercises, such as the monitoring of inner discourse, and meditations on death,115 as being 
integral to Stoicism as a way of life. The point of the spiritual exercises was to train the soul 
to be less prone to unnatural and damaging emotions that detract from the quality of a human 
life, and impede our capacity to act appropriately. If virtuous living is the deliverable of the 
Stoic project then one can forgive them for being shocking, indeed we may perhaps think that 
the more shocking the better, if the purpose is to jolt people out of their complacency. 
With this is mind we can perhaps view the doctrine of divine providence not as a 
metaphysical doctrine but rather as a therapeutic tool for producing virtue in people. This is 
highly suggestive of the point that the Stoic account of virtue, and of happiness, and their 
relation, is not dependent on the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence in any 
conceptually significant sense. The core of the Stoic ethics is simply that virtue is mastery of 
the art of living, namely the acquisition of phronesis (which is a practical contemplativeness), 
and happiness consists in this mastery.  
So, to sum up what has gone before in this chapter we may note that at its core, virtue for the 
Stoics is a matter of acquiring phronesis. To acquire phronesis is to attain to an exceptionally 
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lucid epistemic position of immense knowledge of oneself and the world around one. This 
ensures that one is always able to recognise the appropriate/virtuous course of action and at 
all times pursues this virtuous course of action solely for the sake of virtue. Phronesis so 
understood is constitutive of an ease with all outcomes and productive of an experience of 
tranquil pleasantness, even in situations in which what is appropriate cannot be realised or 
contradicts what might otherwise be understood as one’s self-interest. The acquisition of 
phronesis is however exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The pursuit of it in 
the form of philosophia, or the love of wisdom, is the only thing that is truly worthy of our 
efforts, and should be undertaken without reservation.  
In the remaining three chapters of this paper I am going to pursue an articulation of the 
Stoical project that does not make reference to the doctrine of divine providence. Instead I 
aim to offer a psychological interpretation of the Stoical account of virtue. This will involve 
describing the virtue of the sage as involving a distanced perspective, which is a perspective 
of contemplation. I want to also illustrate how this perspective is constitutive of an ease with 
all outcomes. As the account develops we will get a sense of how we can reasonably maintain 
the core of Stoic ethics without appeal to the doctrine of divine providence. In the next 
chapter I will have some more to say about how it is that the distanced perspective manages 
to account for the essence of Stoic ethics by examining the mode of experience that is 
characteristic of the Stoic sage. 
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III. The Distanced Perspective 
 
The aim in this paper is to defend the sufficiency thesis by way of offering a psychological 
interpretation of the Stoical project. Doing this will allow us to maintain the core of Stoic 
ethics, which is deeply insightful, without committing ourselves to the metaphysical doctrine 
of divine providence. This project will be significantly advanced by considering the mode of 
experience which characterises the Stoic sage. This will furnish us with an account of what 
it’s like to possess the virtue of the sage. Literature on Stoic ethics very often neglects to 
analyse in sufficient detail the characteristic experience of the sage. Much can be achieved 
then by shining the spotlight of this investigation on it. 
Stoic ethical philosophy can be seen as an elaborate justification of the possibility of a 
particular sort of experience. Pierre Hadot makes the point that producing and sustaining this 
sort of experience seems to be the core deliverable of Stoic ethics.116 If Hadot is right, and I 
think that he is, it is aesthetic experience of the world at large which in fact constitutes the 
wisdom of the Stoic sage. Stoic ethics, with its commitment to divine providence, seems to be 
aimed at attaining precisely this end. If this is plausible, this means that the Stoic description 
of virtue as living in agreement with nature, and all that it involves, is in fact a particular 
formulation of an existential position/state of being, which stands independent of it. This 
would mean that the validity of the Stoic project is not in fact dependent upon the plausibility 
of all of their doctrinal assertions. Rather it is dependent upon the plausibility of the 
existential position those doctrinal assertions are attempting to describe, and produce in the 
person of the philosopher. In this chapter I am going to say something about the nature of the 
experience and wisdom of the sage, and pursue an articulation of it that returns to its bare 
essence and does not make use of the doctrine of divine providence.  
To this end let us follow Hadot and turn our attention to considering the figure of the sage 
and his/her relation to the world.117 Through such an analysis we may firstly distil the mode 
of experience which is characteristic of the sage, and which defines the virtuous way of 
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being. This experience is then going to be described as constitutive of what I shall call the 
distanced perspective. The peculiarity of this manner of articulating the experience of the 
sage is that it is primarily psychological and does not require extensive metaphysical 
justification. We are describing the sage’s psychological orientation towards the world. As 
we shall see the happiness of the sage will be seen to be constituted by the psychological 
stance he takes toward the world, where this psychological stance is justifiable independently 
of the doctrine of divine providence.  
Now it should be clear that I aim to understand virtue as involving the distanced perspective. 
More precisely, I am going to understand perfect virtue (which, for the Stoics, is constituted 
by phronesis), as involving the distanced perspective. In essence I aim to achieve this by 
expanding on the notions of ease with all outcomes and detachment, in terms of which the 
Stoic account of virtue and happiness is developed. By doing so I hope to shore up the 
sufficiency of virtue for happiness, and thereby accomplish the aim of this paper, which is to 
articulate a perspective which renders the sufficiency thesis plausible.  
I will have occasion to refer to philosophia in the coming chapters in order to get a sense of 
the plausibility of the distanced perspective as an account of perfect virtue. We can see in 
philosophia a move towards an ever greater state of distance, the perfection of which 
constitutes the distanced perspective (phronesis). It may also be said that this perspective 
seems to be shared by most, if not all, ancient schools and seems to be the ideal, though 
variously described, towards which they were striving.118 That being said, the present chapter 
is concerned with what the distanced perspective is, and why it captures the essence of the 
Stoical project. 
 
3.1 The Experience of the Sage 
 
We shall start by examining the nature of the sage’s experience of the world. The sage’s 
experience of the world is peculiar to him alone. The sage’s agreement with the will of Zeus, 
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his connectedness to the cosmic totality, unlocks a peculiar experience of the world; it 
unlocks aesthetic experience of the world. As Hadot119 points out the fundamental 
characteristic of the Stoic sage is his fundamentally affirmative demeanour towards the 
entirety of existence. This was noted in the previous chapter where it was said that the state of 
agreement with nature constitutes an ease with all outcomes. We may recall that, in essence, 
the state of agreement with nature is a state of detached knowing, or perhaps better a form of 
contemplative, more precisely a practical contemplativeness. To see how the virtue of the 
Stoic sage, the state of detached knowing, is connected with aesthetic experience let us 
expand our understanding of the sage’s ease with all outcomes.  
What is clear when we say that the sage is at ease with all outcomes is that the sage does not 
seek to have things happen other than they do, he is not concerned to make the world 
conform to his agenda. The sage views everything as willed by Zeus, and consequently as a 
necessary part of the maximally well-ordered and complex life history of the world.120 It is 
absolutely imperative that we recognize that this metaphysically grounded ease with all 
outcomes is constitutive of a higher and more divine perspective. The ease with all outcomes 
of the sage in fact seems to be constituted by a perspective akin to the perspective of Zeus, 
which is a view of the whole, or a view of the cosmos. We see in the sage a sort of “cosmic 
consciousness” or “divine perspective”. The sage witnesses events from a cosmic perspective 
and, as I will show, it is this that constitutes his ease with all outcomes.  
Now, the experience is termed cosmic because of the removal of any restrictions and 
partiality from the experience. The Stoic sage was to assume an impartial mode of 
observation in a manner akin to the perspective of Zeus, the impartial but appreciative 
observer who is at ease with all events.121 It is this perspective that poetry was thought to aim 
at expressing. Stephen Mitchell122 notes in his introduction to the Iliad that poetry must give 
joy, even when depicting the most desolating of human experience. Such experiences when 
raised to the level of poetry must be a joy to be savoured, provided one allows oneself to get 
lost in the words. The joy gained from true poetry, such as the Iliad, is the joy of 
understanding where everything – from cruelty to reconciliation, from suffering to ecstasy, 
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from the revolting to the sublime – is appreciated for what it is, with the purest attention. 
Poetry such as the Iliad expresses the divine perspective of Zeus, the ideal observer, who, 
though deeply concerned, is in a state of pure joy. 
I am concerned: so many of them will die. 
But now I shall sit here at ease on a ridge of Olympus 
where I can watch to my heart’s delight.     
[Iliad, 20.20-2]    
The ideal observer looks at the world with a deep sense of peace, he is at ease with all 
outcomes. Not only is he at ease with all outcomes, but he also greets all events with a 
tranquil joy. He recognises the beauty in all he observes, even the most horrendous suffering. 
This is a perspective in which even the most tragic reality is accepted as it is, with tranquil 
joy. This is the experience of the sage, and it is this that constitutes his ease with all 
outcomes. The sage experiences all of life in such a manner. The cosmic consciousness of the 
sage transforms the horrendous into the beautiful.   
It seems absolutely clear that this is the experience that was sought after by the Stoics. 
Marcus Aurelius for example wrote:     
If a person has experience and a deeper insight into the processes of the universe, 
there will be hardly any of these processes that does not appear to him, in at least 
some of its aspects, as pleasant. And he will look upon the gaping jaws of wild beasts 
with no less pleasure than upon the imitations of them that sculptors and painters offer 
us [Meditations 3, 2]. 
In another quote we see Marcus Aurelius inciting us to raise the level of our experience 
towards a greater unity. We see him inciting us to strive towards the experience of the divine 
perspective where we can attain to the vision of the totality: 
Don’t limit yourself to breathing along with the air that surrounds you; from now on, 
think along with the Thought which embraces all things ... you will make a large room 
at once for yourself by embracing in your thought the whole Universe, and grasping 
the ever-continuing Time [Meditations, 8, 54; 9, 32]. 
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It is worth noting again that the pursuit of this higher perspective was not only central to 
Stoicism. We see in other schools the same mode of experience held as an ideal. The 
Epicurean Lucretius similarly seems to capture the phenomenology of the cosmic 
consciousness of the sage when he describes how the world would look to one who saw it for 
the first time.123 Implicit in this quote is the idea that the ideal mode of experience involves 
bringing what is usually outside one’s awareness squarely and lucidly into one’s experience: 
First of all, the bright, clear colour of the sky, and all it holds within it, the stars that 
wander here and there, and the moon and the radiance of the sun with its brilliant 
light; all these, if now they had been seen for the first time by mortals, if, 
unexpectedly, they were in a moment placed before their eyes, what story could be 
told more marvellous than these things, or what that the nations would less dare to 
believe beforehand? Nothing, I believe; so worthy of wonder would this sight have 
been. Yet think how no one now, wearied with satiety of seeing, deigns to gaze up at 
the shining quarters of the sky [On the Nature of Things, 2, 1023-5].                                                                                             
What we see in writings about the sage is that the experience of the sage was thought to be an 
uncoloured experience of broadened awareness, where the world manifests itself to him as it 
is. This constitutes the elevation to the more divine perspective noted above. It is this 
experience that constitutes the sage’s ease with all outcomes. It is very important to 
remember that this ease with all outcomes is to be attained by attaining to wisdom.124 
Wisdom for the Stoics, as with other ancient schools is purely a matter of elevating the soul 
to a higher and more divine perspective, the existential position which constitutes an ease 
with all outcomes.125 Given this relation between the sage’s ease with all outcomes and 
wisdom we can come to an understanding of the essence of wisdom through distilling the 
cosmic consciousness of the sage. 
There are two parts to the experience of the sage which illustrate the nature of wisdom. The 
first thing we see in the experience of the sage is that each thing is experienced for what it is 
and for the relation it bears to the things around it. This is commensurate with an exceptional 
broadening of one’s attention; the sage takes in the world as whole. There is thus a 
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124 Again, wisdom (phronesis) for the Stoics constitutes the entirety of virtue.   
125 Hadot (1995: 244-255) It is worth noting that this perspective seems to be accurately describable as wonder. 
We will have more to say on the connection between wisdom and wonder at the end of this chapter. 
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universality present in the experience of the sage, what would usually be outside one’s 
awareness is to be brought squarely and lucidly back into one’s awareness. The disposition of 
the sage is thus essentially contemplative, and when contemplating individual things, the 
thought of the sage spreads out beyond the obvious to include all those aspects of the thing 
that sit outside of the customary domain of awareness. This can perhaps be described as an 
expansion in understanding. The sage has an immense understanding of all things and events 
insofar as he is simultaneously aware of all of the diverse aspects of a given thing or event, 
many of which will customarily pass us by.  
The second essential part to the experience of the sage is the transcendence present in it. We 
see in the expanded understanding of the sage the absence of any limit to understanding. The 
sage does not experience things as they relate to any agenda he may have; there is no barrier 
to understanding in the experience characteristic of the sage - there isn’t anything preventing 
him from being aware. He has transcended those things that commonly limit our awareness to 
open up those aspects of the world which usually pass us by.126 This is very significant. The 
expanded consciousness/understanding of the sage constitutes a transcendence or a “rising 
above” of the customary, practical way of looking at things.127 We see the presence of this 
transcendence clearly in the Stoics. Marcus Aurelius tells us that we are to: 
Look on earthly things below as if from some place above them – herds, armies, 
farms, weddings, divorces, births, deaths, the noise of law courts, lonely places... a 
mixture of everything and an order composed of contraries [Meditations, 7, 48]. 
This view from above bids us consider the whole of human reality from the perspective of the 
immeasurable dimensions of the cosmos that dwarf it, not only to see each thing as it is but to 
see each thing as it exists in relation to everything else. Marcus Aurelius is asking the 
philosopher to transcend the ordinary way of looking at things which grants central 
significance of the things of human pursuit, and limits one’s awareness. The philosopher is 
strive to attain to a more divine and holistic understanding, such that he recognizes that the 
things of human pursuit are trivial. The sage’s experience is cosmic insofar as he has attained 
to complete transcendence. From this perspective all the indifferents such as health, wealth, 
                                                          
126 This will be developed more fully in the next section. 
127 Hadot (1995: 254-261) 
58 
 
fame, etc. are reduced to completely trivial dimensions.128 They are reduced in dimension to 
the degree that they are no longer deemed worthy of desire. If the sage is to pursue them it 
must be from some motive other than desire.129 We see here why virtue is inconsistent with 
the desire for external goods. 
Wisdom for the Stoics is best understood as this existential standpoint or outlook; the 
detached perspective of Zeus. This is the perspective of an immensely broadened 
understanding, and a transcendence of the things that limit understanding, with the 
recognition that the things of human pursuit (indifferents) are trivial. We can see here the 
validity of describing the wisdom of the sage as a knowing detachment, i.e. as a form of 
contemplativeness. He is detached insofar as he has come to recognize the things of human 
pursuit as trivial. Wisdom thus described constitutes an ease with all outcomes because things 
that would otherwise be troubling come to be seen as trivial and not worthy of desire. The 
wisdom of the sage reduces human troubles to a more trivial dimension such that they are no 
longer troubling and as such constitutes an ease with all outcomes, and is accompanied by a 
tranquil joy. The reader should keep in mind that it is this ease with all outcomes (cosmic 
consciousness) that renders the happiness of the sage invulnerable. This is therefore the 
grounds for the possibility of the sufficiency thesis. My defence of the sufficiency thesis will 
therefore be deemed plausible only insofar as the cosmic consciousness of the sage is deemed 
to be a plausible existential position. The challenge now is to show the plausibility of the 
cosmic consciousness of the sage. 
 
3.2 The Distanced Perspective. 
 
It has to be admitted that the cosmic consciousness of the sage does seem to be, initially at 
least, completely alien to us. This will of course strike most as a problem because it is not 
entirely reasonable to assent to the value of an existential position that we are not able to 
grasp. However, it is in fact possible to show that the cosmic consciousness of the sage is not 
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experience in which they become completely trivial to the one who has such an expanded consciousness. 
129 If the sage is to act then it is not action as we commonly understand it. 
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so completely alien to us. Our engagement with works of art, in particular our aesthetic 
experience of artworks, allows us to further imagine what the cosmic consciousness of the 
sage might be like and hence substantiate its plausibility.130  
The key theme that permeates all discussion of aesthetic experience is its 
disinterested/detached character. It is for this reason that aesthetic experience is unique in its 
poignancy. Aesthetic experience can be described as an appreciation of the world for itself 
and not for how it is useful. The appropriate form of engagement with an artwork is 
contemplation or attention to the thing as it is rather than attention to the thing as a tool for 
action. Aesthetic experience is “innocent” experience. The innocence of aesthetic experience 
seems to consist in its selflessness, or its emptiness of an agenda, i.e. its disinterestedness. 
This innocence of aesthetic experience gives an excellent insight into the psychological 
standpoint which constitutes it. Edward Bullough explicates very well the mode of 
engagement involved in aesthetic experience. He refers to this mode of engagement as 
psychical distance. Bullough illustrates his notion of psychical distance with the use of a 
wonderful example.131 It must be noted that Bullough’s notion of psychical distance is a 
notion that bears directly upon the cosmic consciousness of the sage.  
Bullough uses the example of a heavy fog at sea to illustrate his point. To be on a ship that is 
in dense fog can be a distinctly unpleasant experience for both seamen and landlubbers. Fog 
can engender anxiety and fear over the possibility of hidden dangers and as such is regarded 
as a “dreaded terror” of the seas.132 The fog contains the possibility of numerous hazards. 
Perceived as such it is only natural that one’s experience of it be negative. But as Bullough 
points out so eloquently “a fog at sea can be an intense source of relish and enjoyment.”133 It 
seems that the anxiety and fear exists only as long as the desire for self-preservation gets in 
the way.134 What the subject needs to do is detach himself from his desire for self-
preservation to open up the possibility of the perception of the world as it is transformed by 
the fog. He needs to detach himself from the habitual and utilitarian perception of the fog, 
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132 Bullough (1989: 759) 
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134 The point is not that one cannot act to preserve oneself as it were. The point is rather than one’s 
experience must not be structured in terms of this agenda. One may still respond to preserve one’s 
constitution but one’s experience of the fog must not be the experience of a thing-threatening-my-
constitution. 
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where after what is left is an experience of those aspects of the world, as it manifests through 
the fog, which transcend our ordinary experience.  
[The] veil surrounding you with an opaqueness as of transparent milk, blurring the 
outline of things and distorting their shapes into weird grotesqueness; observe the 
carrying power of the air, producing the impression as if you could touch some far off 
siren by merely putting out your hand and letting it lose itself behind that white wall; 
note the curious creamy smoothness of the water, hypocritically denying as it were 
any suggestion of danger; and, above all the strange solitude and remoteness from the 
world, as it can be found only on the highest mountain tops: and the experience may 
acquire, in its uncanny mingling of repose and terror, a flavour of such concentrated 
poignancy and delight as to contrast sharply with the blind and distempered anxiety of 
its other aspects.135 
The three eloquent passages of philosophical writing of which the above quotation forms a 
part seems to highlight with impressive clarity the possibility of two seemingly contrary 
experiences of the same phenomenon, the first fearful and the second seemingly expressive of 
a deeper understanding. In the second the perceiver’s eyes have been opened as it were to 
aspects of the experience which are ordinarily hidden. It seems to the perceiver as though the 
world has revealed itself. 
I take it that the point of the example is that the experiences alluded to above are 
differentiated by the perspective the agent takes on the world. In the first instance the fog was 
perceived as the harbinger of danger, the agent adopted a practical standpoint towards the fog 
such that it is experienced in relation to the agent’s practical agenda. The beautiful aspects of 
the world as it manifests in the fog were not perceived but hidden behind the practical import 
the fog presents. In the second instance the experience is radically different. The world itself 
is perceived (mutated as it is by the fog) in a more holistic manner whereupon the sublime 
characteristics which objectively constitute the experience reveal themselves. The world as it 
exists, irrespective of the agenda of the agent, reveals itself. This radical difference is 
indicative of a distinct psychological standpoint adopted towards the fog. 
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We should remember that our lives are for the most part conducted from a practical 
standpoint. From within this standpoint of practical perception we are selective in our 
perception, retaining only that which contributes to our action in the world. This practical 
standpoint hides from us the world qua world.136 Distance, as Bullough articulates it, involves 
a radical transformation of our relationship to the world. This transformation entails a 
suspension of the practical standpoint. Our pragmatic attitude must be cut out of our 
apprehension of the world.137 To adopt the distanced perspective is to become distanced in 
sense very similar to this. The distanced perspective is a psychological standpoint of “pure” 
attention to the world as it is and rather than thinking of it as a tool for some further use.  
Bullough describes138 this cutting out of the practical standpoint as putting the phenomenon 
‘out of gear’ with one’s practical self. This means that there must be a distance between the 
self and the affections. Bullough uses the term “affections” in its broadest sense to mean 
anything that “affects our being, bodily or spiritually, e.g. as sensation, perception, emotional 
state or idea.”139 Affections then include fears and desires such that one’s own instinctive 
affective responses become part of the phenomena and hence also become the object of 
contemplation and understanding. When putting a phenomenon out of gear with the practical 
self one allows the phenomenon to stand outside the context of one’s personal needs, ends 
and pragmatic agenda. At its core then what is required is a detachment from things we 
ordinarily take to be good. This is a distancing from our own ends and the suspension of our 
fascination with seeing these ends realised.  
We see here the exceptional similitude between Bullough’s psychical distancing and the 
wisdom of the sage. One of the most distinctive characteristics of the sage is his detachment 
from indifferents. The cosmic consciousness of the sage, which, as we saw, is to be identified 
with wisdom, is the experience of one who has drawn away from the things of human pursuit. 
The sage becomes distanced (in a manner akin to the psychical distancing described by 
Bullough), takes in the world as whole, and hence becomes detached from his own affections, 
viewing them with disinterest, and thus, in a sense, withdrawing from them, that is, seeing 
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them as trivial and treating them as indifferent, neither good nor bad in themselves.140 The 
Stoic sage’s withdrawal from indifferents constitutes his ease with all outcomes (cosmic 
consciousness) insofar as it results in a joyous “Yes!” accorded to each moment.141  
We see in Bullough’s psychical distancing then the plausibility of the cosmic consciousness 
of the sage and hence the plausibility of my defence of the sufficiency thesis. We can make 
sense of the cosmic consciousness of the sage in a manner similar to the one with which we 
make sense of our aesthetic experience of artworks. The sage occupies a distanced 
perspective, like the one referred to by Bullough, where the insertion of distance transforms 
his experience. The insertion of distance expands the sage’s awareness such that he rises 
above the practical standpoint which places such heavy significance on the value of 
indifferents. He thus becomes detached from his affective responses, such as fear, anger, 
envy, etc. because he deems the concerns which give rise to these responses as, in some 
sense, trivial; they are not deemed to be real concerns. As Seneca tells us: 
The soul has attained the culmination of happiness when, having crushed underfoot 
all that is evil, it takes flight and penetrates the inner recesses of nature. It is then, 
while wandering amongst the very stars, that it likes to laugh at the costly pavements 
of the rich... But the soul cannot despise all these riches before it has been all around 
the world, and casting a contemptuous glance at the narrow globe of the earth from 
above, says to itself: “So this is the pin-point which so many nations divide among 
themselves with fire and sword? How ridiculous are the boundaries of men!” [Natural 
Questions, I, Preface, 7-9]142 
He is thus at ease with all outcomes, even those outcomes that produce instinctive negative 
responses. He does not take his negative responses seriously, because he is not attached to the 
interests that produce them but instead contemplates and understands them as part of the 
phenomena.   
We see then that the invulnerability of the sage is not so bizarre. It is simply the result of the 
insertion of distance. To further illustrate the point we can look at an analogy. To attain to the 
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wisdom of the sage is to adopt a perspective similar to the perspective of a spectator at a play. 
As Sedgwick says: 
The peculiar pleasure of the theatre then is the spectacle of life...and this spectacle, 
when it pleases or holds us, we do not view with the “swelling of pride” of 
superiority, but with a sort of paradoxical sympathy; for though it is sympathy, it is 
likewise detached.143 
  
The spectator does not experience the events in the play as relevant to his practical agenda. 
He is, or at least he should be, at ease with all eventualities which constitute the plot of the 
play. He observes objectively, taking note of the intricacies and intrigues of the plot, 
savouring the feelings and emotional responses that the play excites within, free from his 
practical mode of experience. The spectator is free to be moved by the events, never pushed 
to anguish or despair, free from anxieties that affect his own being and free from any sense of 
threat to himself. Even the negative affective responses excited by the play such as fear, pity, 
anger, etc. are blunted such they themselves are the object of appreciation and excite a certain 
pleasure in the spectator. The spectator is free to become aware of and understand the 
unfolding plot and his emotional responses to it in a manner which would be closed to him if 
he were to be one of the characters, caught up the events that constitute the plot. He observes 
as that divine spectator, uninvolved and immune, but deeply concerned. To attain to the 
wisdom of the sage is to become distanced in precisely this manner so as to experience all 
events as part of a grand play. It is to elevate oneself so as to experience all events, even 
one’s own action and feeling, as an “audience member” and not as an “actor”, even though 
one finds oneself situated centre stage in the grand production. 
The wisdom of the Stoic sage then is nothing other than a form of cutting out of the practical 
standpoint, of putting the phenomenon out of gear with the practical self. It is a transcendence 
of the obsession to have our particular ends realised. This transcendence is the result of an 
insertion of distance between the self and the affections. The insertion of distance is a matter 
of attaining to an expanded awareness. It is a matter of adopting the contemplative standpoint 
in each moment of one’s life and consequently attaining to an immense understanding of 
things and their value. Indeed this is a matter of attaining to a cosmic understanding.  
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It has to be admitted that there are differences between the distanced perspective occupied by 
the sage and the psychical distancing we see in Bullough. One possible difference consists in 
the distinct levels of control manifested in each. The distancing described by Bullough may 
occur when one’s attention snaps like a wire for a brief moment to a higher perspective.144 
This description illustrates a lack of control over the insertion of distance. The distancing of 
the sage would presumably be something more controlled and less accidental; the sage surely 
is the master of his own distance.  
It is important to stress however that there is no need to spend time exploring the differences 
between the distancing expressed by Bullough and the distancing of the sage. What is 
significant is how they are a-like. Both essentially involve the insert of distance between the 
self and the affections and thereby render the happiness of the person invulnerable. The 
distancing expressed by Bullough is a phenomenon we are familiar with since we often 
experience this sort of distancing in our engagement with artworks. Given that we are 
familiar with the distancing described by Bullough we can thus easily make sense of how the 
wisdom of the sage makes him invulnerable. The sage’s happiness is invulnerable because his 
wisdom involves an insertion of distance of the like we see in Bullough. The essence of 
wisdom then is that it is a distanced perspective. We see the wisdom of the sage 
approximated by the distancing described by Bullough. 
I should remind the reader here that the wisdom of the sage is an ideal. This is something we 
are to strive for but whether or not we will ever manage to get there, and whether or not we 
will ever manage to truly be happy, is doubtful. It is again for this reason that philosophia or 
the love of or progress towards wisdom, plays such a significant role in Ancient philosophy, 
not least in Stoicism. As Hadot tells us: 
The Stoics... declared explicitly that philosophy, for them, was an “exercise.” In their 
view, philosophy did not consist in teaching an abstract theory – much less in the 
exegesis of texts – but rather in the art of living. It is a concrete attitude and 
determinate life-style, which engages the whole of existence. The philosophical act is 
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not situated merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the self and of being. It is a 
progress which causes us to be more fully, and makes us better.145 
The role played by the consideration of the sage and his way of being is that it provides us 
with a goal to strive for with philosophical activity. The validity of this endeavour is 
grounded in the goodness that is thought to consist in the sage’s way of being. The 
philosophical act is a worthy endeavour because the end it aims at is wholly good. The ideal 
represented by the sage represents the possibility of our own happiness. This is because 
happiness is to be understood as the possession of the good and virtue, as it is articulated in 
the person of the sage, constitutes that good. 
Once all the dogmas of Stoicism have been stripped away we can come to the essence of the 
Stoic pursuit. The essence of the Stoic pursuit is to attain to the distanced perspective, to 
attain to the cosmic consciousness of the sage. This is to attain to virtue or greatness of soul. 
To attain to the distanced perspective is to rise above individual, passionate subjectivity to the 
universal perspective which holds within itself the thought of the Whole.146 Stoic virtue is the 
fruit of the universality of thought. This understanding of virtue is not a consequence of Stoic 
doctrinal assertions. Rather all Stoic doctrinal assertions are sub-servant to virtue so 
understood. It is the pursuit of attaining the distanced perspective that is of primary 
significance and it is this that grounds Stoic doctrines and not the other way around. They 
exist solely to usher aspirants towards this most wondrous prize.147 We should avoid the urge 
to judge the validity of the end based solely on the discomfort we feel with one articulation of 
it, especially if this articulation serves only to assist us in the pursuit of attaining the end. It 
would be unwise then to dismiss the validity of the Stoic endeavour solely because we are 
uncomfortable with one or more of the Stoic doctrines. This would be like denying the 
existence of a hospital based solely on the fact that we are uncomfortable with the description 
of hospitals provided in the map we are given to find the hospital. 
Thus we have an idea of what psychological standpoint constitutes the cosmic consciousness 
of the sage. I noted at the beginning of this chapter that the defining attribute of the sage is 
the sage’s possession of wisdom where wisdom is constitutive of the cosmic consciousness of 
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the sage. I have subsequently illustrated how the wisdom of the sage involves the ability to 
adopt a distanced perspective similar to the psychical distancing described by Bullough. We 
may briefly remind ourselves here that the cosmic consciousness of the sage is immune to 
misfortune. The sage experiences the world with understanding and shares in the pleasure of 
understanding, even of the horrifying. This pleasure is immune from misfortunes because 
even the most horrifying misfortunes are experienced as indifferent. Furthermore the 
possession of the distanced perspective is immune to the possibility of misfortune because 
there can be no misfortune which shakes the sage from his perspective of detachment. The 
distanced perspective, once fully attained, is unshakable. This then is clearly an endorsement 
of the sufficiency thesis. Wisdom is to be viewed as the sole constituent of happiness because 
it elevates the sage to a position of understanding in which the sage is at ease with all 
outcomes and enjoys the sophisticated pleasure accrued from such understanding and 
furthermore, indifferents become trivial. We have a good case for the sufficiency thesis since 
we have a plausible analogue for the cosmic consciousness of the sage which comes in the 
form of Bullough’s description of psychical distancing and the experience so accrued.  
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IV. The Rationality of the Distanced 
Perspective 
 
We may remind ourselves that the aim of this paper is to explore a possible defence of the 
sufficiency thesis. In order to achieve this we introduced the distanced perspective as a 
psychological perspective/standpoint that enables a joyous response to all events. Virtue as 
involving the distanced perspective is thought to be a good which alone is sufficient to make 
a life good and worth living, even if it lacks all the goods common sense tells us are required 
for a human life to be good and happy.  
We introduced the distanced perspective in order to account for the experience described by 
the ancients as the experience of the sage. The experience of the sage seems to be nicely 
describable as a form of aesthetic experience of the world. This is the cosmic consciousness 
of the sage which involves a detached and disinterested psychological standpoint. This 
psychological standpoint is the distanced perspective. The insertion opens up a broader 
awareness and understanding of the world which is so often hidden by the practical 
standpoint. The sage thereby rises above the practical standpoint and becomes detached from 
his desire for external goods and experiences them as indifferent. He is thus liberated from 
any constraint on his happiness and so becomes invulnerable such that his happiness is 
immune even in the face of the greatest of misfortunes. He has risen above the standpoint in 
which misfortune can spoil his happiness. 
We however run into a serious challenge to the plausibility of our current defence of the 
sufficiency thesis. The difficulty is that it is not entirely clear why it is rational to have a such 
a transformed experience of otherwise horrifying events. The plausibility of our defence of 
the sufficiency thesis depends on adequately answering this concern. It is to this that we will 
turn our attention in the current chapter. Dealing with this difficulty will also provide an 
opportunity to further flesh out our understanding of the virtuous agent. Let us first start by 
explicating the nature of the problem in the required detail. 
The difficulty is generated by the nature of the distanced perspective. The distanced 
perspective, we may remember was said to be a perspective which opened up the possibility 
of experiencing great misfortunes with no more unease and no less pleasure than one’s 
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experience of great strokes of good fortune. This is illustrated by Mitchell’s description of 
Homer.148 As Mitchell notes, the poetic perspective, which is the distanced perspective, raises 
one to a level of experience where even the most horrendous suffering is mutated into 
something that can be affirmed and appreciated. We are faced here with a problematic 
question. What does the mutation of experience involved in the distanced perspective entail? 
Does it entail experiencing evils as good? The accusation here then is that the appreciation, or 
better yet affirmation, of evils we find in the distanced perspective must surely involve a 
misrepresentation of the evil events. If this is the case then we cannot accept the distanced 
perspective as a plausible component in wisdom because wisdom is incompatible with this 
kind of misrepresentation since wisdom also involves understanding.  
We can rephrase this problem in terms of the rationality of the distanced perspective. It seems 
reasonable to maintain that our attitudes towards events are only rational and justified when 
they accurately represent the value properties of those events. It seems that, barring some 
exceptions, the rationality of the attitude we adopt toward a given event depends on its 
correlation with the value properties that objectively constitute the event. If we accept this 
then we must accept that it is irrational to respond to a despicable and morally detestable 
event with an appreciative and affirmative attitude. On these grounds some may claim that 
the distanced perspective is actually irrational in a world in which evil does in fact occur. 
What are we to say to this objection? What we need to do in order to deal with this problem is 
to illustrate how the positive and affirmative experience of negative events that accompanies 
the distance perspective is justified.  
One thing we may want to do is to affirm that the world is wholly good. This, I feel, is the 
solution of the Stoics. We see here the substantial work done by the metaphysical doctrine of 
divine providence. The Stoic conception of fate ensures that the whole sequence of events 
that constitutes the cosmos is maximally well-ordered and good and also ensures that the only 
evil that could possibly befall us is the evil we do to ourselves.149 The only evil that is present 
in the world for the stoics consists in mistaken judgments of indifferents as good or bad. This 
is not however really evil that is present in the world rather this is evil present in a moral 
agent who has failed to correctly orientate himself towards the world. The key to the Stoic 
defence of the sufficiency thesis is the idea that the only evil one can suffer is the evil of 
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one’s own moral failing. Evil and morally bankrupt events, including the actions of others, 
are themselves only apparently evil. If we were to fully appreciate them and their place in the 
cosmos we would recognise that they are in fact indifferent. To judge such events to be 
actually and objectively evil is to mistakenly judge some indifferent thing as good or bad and 
consequently to suffer evil of your own making. So the Stoic justification of the positive 
valuation of events with apparently negative value properties is two-fold. Firstly, the world is 
affirmed as good and secondly all apparent evils are just the result of mistakenly judging 
indifferents to be of genuine value, which they are not. In essence the Stoics deny that events 
can have negative value properties. 
So we see that Stoic metaphysics provides a sort of ideological optimism about the goodness 
of the cosmos which rationalises a positive evaluation of events with apparently negative 
value properties. Note how this is different from maintaining that evils are instrumental 
goods, i.e. they are in fact bad but are necessary for some higher good. It is also different 
from moral nihilism,150 the view that there are no such things as value properties such that 
there is no such thing as good and evil. It likewise differs from moral relativism, or the view 
that evils are only evil relative to a given individual or group. Now I feel that none of these 
are promising avenues, each for its own reason. I will not discuss these reasons here, except 
to note my reason for not pursuing the Stoic strategy. My reason for avoiding the Stoic 
strategy is not that it is incoherent or is conceptually deficient in any way. My reason is 
simply that the whole Stoic metaphysical picture is alien to the modern world-view. In 
particular, I imagine it to be a bit of a stretch to convince a contemporary reader that all evils 
are only apparently evil and that the world does not actually and objectively contain evil 
independently of the agent’s moral will as it were. The beauty of the distanced perspective is 
that I feel that it can be maintained even if we accept that the world actually and objectively 
contains evil. I am going to pursue this avenue because doing so will make my position all 
the stronger.  
A second and more promising option, and one which is worth exploring, is to appeal to the 
concept of organic unities. The strategy here is to accept that many events are morally 
despicable and worthy only of moral disgust and outrage and perhaps even despair and 
resentment, responses which are very far from appreciation and joyous tranquillity. Granting 
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this it is however possible to maintain that these morally despicable events are always 
situated within a greater whole, constituted by some organic unity, which is good such that 
the appreciation when these events are experienced from the distanced perspective is an 
appreciation of the goodness of the greater whole within which these events are situated. 
Thinking that the whole is good and worthy of appreciation is consistent with the recognition 
that one, or perhaps more, of its parts has negative value properties and is not worthy of 
appreciation. 
The distanced perspective would then involve the capacity to recognize and appreciate the 
goodness of an organic unity which is itself good when considered as a whole, even though it 
may be constituted by parts that are bad. Practically the idea would work something like this. 
If we were to watch a lion killing a zebra we may judge that an event of negative value has 
taken place. We may think that this event is distressing and is not something to be 
appreciated. If however we recognize that the lion killing the zebra is an essential part of an 
organized unity of a larger ecosystem we can wonder at the ecosystem itself. We can 
appreciate and be awe-struck at this organic unity, which is magnificent, even though we may 
have judged that the killing of the zebra, as an essential part of the ecosystem, is distressing.  
The idea then is not that we appreciate the killing of the zebra. Rather we appreciate and 
wonder at the ecosystem within which the killing of the zebra is an essential part. Doing this 
would involve situating the killing of the zebra within the interconnected nexus of events, 
processes and beings that constitute the ecosystem. In other words we experience the 
ecosystem in the killing of the zebra and wonder at it – in a sense we see one thing as 
another. The killing of the zebra when experienced in isolation is distressing. When it is 
situated in the context of the whole ecosystem within which it is an essential part, it becomes 
a window into a greater reality, that constituted by the eco-system as a whole, which is good 
and worthy of a joyous response. Even when joyously wondering at the whole ecosystem we 
may feel distress over the death of the zebra. This distress will however be tempered by the 
rapturous appreciation of the greater reality of the ecosystem and the recognition that the 
killing of the zebra is an essential part of the eco-system. The concern over the death of the 
zebra will in a sense be trivialized in light of the awareness of the greater reality of eco-
system 
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The key here is seeing the whole in the part. The distanced perspective is uniquely suited to 
this type of “double seeing”. Indeed this sort of expanded consciousness is an essential 
element of what it means to adopt the distanced perspective. This is surely what is sought 
when the ancients incite us to strive to attain to the “universality of thought”.151 We are to 
seek to perceive, understand and be aware of an event as it exists in relation to the greater 
whole within which it forms an essential part. We are to strive to experience the whole in its 
parts because to truly understand the part is to apprehend it as an essential part of the whole.  
The advantage of this strategy is that it does not, like the Stoic strategy, involve analysing 
away evil.152 Instead it involves seeing past the evil. It involves adopting a broader 
perspective on the evil and in a sense reducing it to a more trivial dimension. This seems to 
be precisely what is achieved by the distanced perspective, the broadening of the agent’s 
awareness such that the trials and tribulations of humanity are reduced to a more trivial 
dimension. The distanced perspective is one which sees to it that one’s troubles, though still 
troubles are no longer troubling. 
The concern with this strategy is that it is not clear that it works for all possible cases. I do 
think that this line of defence works well with cases such as the death of the zebra where the 
distressing event can easily be viewed as an essential part of a harmonious and good organic 
unity. It will be objected however that not all distressing and morally bankrupt events can be 
plausibly situated within such harmonious and good organic unities. One may ask; what 
about senseless evils? Are there not many senseless evils, predominantly those committed by 
human beings, which are not constitutive of any greater whole? What of cases such as the 
fate of Job? What greater whole can be appreciated when a man loses all his wealth, all his 
children and all his friends? What about a case in which someone’s children are deliberately 
murdered in cold blood? What organic unity is this a part of? Many would claim I am sure 
that there is no greater unity which can or should temper our moral outrage to these types of 
evils. They are not constitutive of a greater whole which is good. Many would claim that the 
only appropriate response when such evils befall one is despair and moral outrage.  
                                                          
151 Hadot (1995: 82-83) 
152 It could in fact be argued that this is in fact precisely the aim of the Stoic strategy. The Stoic strategy can be 
viewed as an ideological tool designed to help the philosopher see past evils to appreciate the greater reality 
in which the evils are subsumed. 
72 
 
The question which arises then is whether there is always a good organic unity that can 
justify a joyous response. One could of course respond here by arguing that the whole, i.e. the 
cosmos, is overall good, i.e. it is a good organic unity which can justify a joyous response to 
any evil. By doing so we would guarantee that evils are always subsumed within a good 
organic unity insofar as they are subsumed within the cosmos, which is good. My concern 
with this is the probable impossibility of providing a philosophically convincing argument to 
substantiate this claim. This is made all the more pointed by the fact that the distanced 
perspective is an idealized standpoint. The best we as philosophers can hope for is in all 
probability philosophia which is the standpoint in which the agent “gazes upwards” towards a 
more unified and holistic understanding. Comprehensive understanding of, and acquaintance 
with the whole, i.e. the cosmos, is in all likelihood well beyond any of us. It is thus difficult 
to understand how we can decide upon the question as to whether the whole is good without 
actually seeing that it is for ourselves. 
I am pessimistic about the possibility of showing, in any philosophically convincing manner, 
that there is always a naturally describable organic unity to justify a joyous response. What I 
am however convinced about is that it is fact not necessary for me to do so. My first reason 
for thinking this is that we do not in fact require anything that is recognisable as an organic 
unity for the type of double seeing of the distanced perspective to be possible. We see this 
illustrated by Socrates’ in Plato’s Phaedo. In this dialogue Socrates wonders at the peculiar 
intermingling of pain and pleasure that arises once his shackles are removed [60b1-c5]. When 
wondering Socrates treats the event as an opportunity for contemplation and thereby inserts 
distance between himself and the content of the experience. He thereby comes to an 
awareness of both the pleasure and the pain as coexisting simultaneously within the same 
event which liberates him from being torn being pleasure and pain. It is not entirely clear that 
Socrates is in fact aware of some organic unity within which the pain is subsumed. What 
Socrates is aware of is the unification of the opposites in the experience, the pleasant with the 
painful. Essentially he has risen to the epistemological standpoint which unifies the good and 
the bad in his experience, he is able to recognise the fundamental duality present in the event. 
His epistemological standpoint in a sense creates unity where there is no naturally describable 
organic unity. This then is an instance of double seeing of the sort we are proposing is 
characteristic of the distanced perspective but where the double seeing is not dependent upon 
the presence of some naturally describable organic unity. 
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One may ask however - is there always good such that one can unify the good with the bad to 
produce a whole worthy of a joyous response? Why not think that there sometimes is no good 
present in an event or why not feel that the bad outweighs the good? If this were the case then 
a unification of the sort illustrated by Socrates would not produce something worthy of a 
joyous response. It would seem then that we have to provide philosophical proof for the claim 
that, even though the virtuous agent recognizes that an evil, with no apparent good in sight, 
has occurred, even affecting something dear to him, it is rational for the virtuous agent to not 
despair over it or respond to it with a negative emotional response. As it turns out however I 
do not think that it is actually necessary for me to do so. I feel that it is plausible to believe 
that it is required of the sage that he manifest courage in the face of such events and thereby 
resist the urge to be reduced to despair and rather find some means of affirming his own 
existence. We see precisely this expressed by Paul Tillich in his discussion of Stoic courage:  
Courage as the universal and essential self-affirmation of one's being is an ontological 
concept. The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in 
spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-
affirmation. ...The affirmation of one's essential being in spite of desires and anxieties 
creates joy. Lucillus is exhorted by Seneca to make it his business "to learn how to 
feel joy." It is not the joy of fulfilled desires to which he refers, for real joy is a 
"severe matter"; it is the happiness of a soul which is "lifted above every 
circumstance." Joy accompanies the self-affirmation of our essential being in spite of 
the inhibitions coming from the accidental elements in us. Joy is the emotional 
expression of the courageous Yes to one's own true being. ...In the ontological act of 
the self- affirmation of one's essential being courage and joy coincide.153 
 
Given this I feel we have sufficient reason to believe that, no matter the nature of the event, 
the virtuous agent can rationally be at ease with the event and greet it with tranquil joy. This 
is the case even if it would appear to us that the event is wholly bad, such as in the fate of 
Priam or Job. And whilst we do not have irrefutable proof that this is always possible, the 
burden of proof in fact lies with my opponents to show that it isn’t. 
                                                          
153 Tillich (2000; 3, 14-15) 
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In order to sketch out this defence I would like to return to a consideration of the philosopher, 
of one who is striving for wisdom. The purpose of doing this is that what we see in the 
striving philosopher gives us reason to think that as one approaches the ideal of the sage one 
should be immune to misfortune. This is because being so immune seems to be part of what 
striving to act in the best of manners involves. I remind the reader that the thing that above all 
characterises the philosopher is his love of virtue. The sage and the philosopher are similar in 
this regard. Both value virtue but only the sage has actually attained it. The point I want to 
stress is that the philosopher is as much striving to behave virtuously as he is striving to attain 
to wisdom; he is thus fundamentally concerned with acting in the best of manners. This is 
simply because every virtue is to be analysed as a kind of wisdom.  
The key point we should extract from the above is that the love of virtue involves a striving to 
always act in the best of manners. What is clear then is that the philosopher is fundamentally 
committed to virtuous action and acting in the best of manners in any given situation. It 
seems safe to assume that the sage is someone who always succeeds in acting in the best of 
manners. It would be unbecoming of the sage to act in any other manner because he is a 
fundamentally good being.  We can therefore get a sense of the validity of the sage’s 
response in the striving of the philosopher.  
So we see that the philosopher always tries to act in the best of manners and the sage is 
someone who always succeeds in acting in the best of manners. This is no different in cases 
of severe misfortune. In cases of severe misfortune, as in any other case, the philosopher will 
strive to act in the best of manners and the sage will succeed in doing so. Now of course, the 
best manner in which one can act is the manner which is most conducive to virtue, and 
bringing about the good of the whole. What we should recognise however is that there is 
something contradictory here if we are to assert that the best manner in which one can act 
should involve breaking down in the face of severe misfortune, to be reduced to a state of 
compromised happiness. To maintain this it seems we are ask both the philosopher and the 
sage to behave in a contradictory manner, on the one hand to do what is best and on the other 
hand to breakdown in the face of misfortune. Surely it makes more sense to assert that the 
sage is unique insofar as he does not breakdown in the face of even the most severe 
misfortune. This is because the sage is one who always acts in the best of manners and 
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breaking down is to fail to act in the best of manners, it is to fail to remain composed in the 
face of adversity.   
We see this validated by what we expect from the philosopher. It seems entirely reasonable to 
believe that we, as non-sages, should endeavour towards this steadfastness in the face of 
adversity.  We surely do think highly of those who are able to maintain their composure and 
tranquillity in testing times. We respect those who are able to rise above their own misfortune 
and find blessing in circumstances which we may find unbearable. That we may fail to 
achieve this excellence in response in cases of severe misfortune may perhaps be 
understandable. It can still reasonably be thought to constitute a failing in our virtue, though 
perhaps an understandable failing. Striving to attain to the sort of equanimity we see in the 
sage is an endeavour many of us deem to be consistent with the pursuit of virtue and 
becoming good. It is for precisely this reason that I am of the view that the burden of proof 
lies with my opponent on this matter.  
If we are to accept that it would be unbecoming of a sage to breakdown in the face of 
misfortune, it seems that we are prima facie committed to the rationality of the distanced 
perspective even in instances in which we, as non-sages, see only bad. It seems then that the 
failing is not in the rationality of the sage’s response. Rather the failing is in our incapacity to 
see past the bad to recognise the good. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that the sage is 
aware of the good, even if this good consists solely in the goodness of his own response, in 
instances where others see only bad and hence is able to maintain his equanimity and 
tranquillity in the face of even the greatest of misfortunes.  Once again, the burden of proof 
lies with my opponent to show that this is not the case, either by showing that the perfectly 
virtuous agent is not someone who always acts in the best of manners or by providing a 
philosophical proof that many events do not have any good available for the virtuous agent to 
become aware of. It is not entirely clear how either of these can be achieved. 
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Conclusion 
 
My objective in this paper has been relatively modest. I aimed to defend the sufficiency thesis 
by way of articulating an understanding of the core Stoic virtue that entails the sufficiency 
thesis thereby rendering it plausible. Again the sufficiency thesis is the view that virtue, as a 
good, is sufficient for happiness where the happiness of the virtuous agent is immune to 
misfortune. As I noted in the introduction, the substantial challenge faced by the sufficiency 
thesis is the problem of external goods. In order to lend some theoretical substance to the 
intuition that sits behind the problem of external goods I offered an Aristotelian type account 
of virtue which left room for external goods. The space was created for external goods by 
postulating that the desire for external goods is in accordance with virtue. We saw then that. 
provided an account of virtue acknowledges that desire for external goods is in accordance 
with virtue, there will be the conceptual space to acknowledge them as necessary for 
happiness. They are good for us insofar as they are good for that part of ourselves which 
rightly desires them, i.e. desires them in accordance with virtue, where the good of this part 
of the soul is thought to form part of happiness.  
Given that the space is created for external goods by validating the legitimacy of the desire 
for external goods by way of postulating a part of the soul that rightly desires them, the 
obvious response to the problem of external goods is to show that the desire for them is 
inconsistent with virtue, or at least inconsistent with the virtue that constitutes happiness. In 
order to show this we explored the Stoic account of virtue which countenances a purifying 
one-self of any desire for external goods. We see in the Stoic attitude towards indifferents a 
form of detachment which constitutes an ease with all outcomes.  
It did acknowledge that there are aspects of Stoic ethics which clash with the contemporary 
world-view. One is seen in the fact that the Stoic understanding of the virtuous agent is 
completely alien to our modern way of thinking.  This is in no way helped by the fact that it 
is seen to rely upon the doctrine of divine providence, which is no doubt a metaphysical 
doctrine which will have few contemporary supporters. In order to render the sufficiency 
thesis more plausible I endeavoured to show that these clashes can be overcome, in the first 
instance by showing that the insights behind the Stoic description of the virtuous agent can be 
related to concepts we are more familiar with and in the second instance showing that the 
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core of Stoic ethics does not require the metaphysical doctrine of divine providence in any 
conceptually necessary sense.  
In essence I feel I achieved this by arguing that the Stoic definition of virtue has both 
existential and metaphysical components. The notion of connectedness has to do with, at 
least, the sage’s ease with all outcomes. This state of connectedness is a state of virtue. But 
this means that there is room to distinguish the conception of virtue, at least logically, from 
its metaphysical presuppositions. I argued that the state of connectedness involves the 
capacity to become detached from indifferents, that is, see them as indifferent and hence as 
irrelevant for our happiness. Virtue then involves the capacity to occupy a “distanced 
perspective” which renders the happiness of the virtuous agent immune to even the greatest 
of misfortunes. 
I argued that this distanced perspective is to be understood as a psychological stance which 
involves a suspension of the practical standpoint in which our diverse desires for things such 
as health, wealth, friendship, etc. govern our experience and engagement with the world. The 
distanced perspective is a perspective from which our engagement with and experience of the 
world is not defined by these diverse desires we may be subject to, it is in essence a 
transcendence of a sort, a transcendence of the desires for external goods. The distanced 
perspective is to be understood as the psychological standpoint of contemplation where the 
capacity to adopt this psychological standpoint in any situation is a component of virtue. 
Since this psychological standpoint allows the one who adopts it to view indifferents as 
indifferent, it renders the agent’s happiness immune to misfortune and in need of no other 
goods beyond virtue. It is constitutive of an ease with all outcomes and a tranquil and stable 
joy that is free from the requirement for any and all goods other than virtue. In essence virtue 
is incompatible with the desire for external goods insofar as wisdom raises one to a position 
in which external goods are seen to be trivial. This existential position constitutes an ease 
with all outcomes and hence constitutes happiness. 
I furthermore considered and responded to the objection which I find most pressing. This 
objection comes in the form of the concern that occupying the distanced perspective involves 
a certain form of misrepresentation of the world. The distanced perspective involves a 
mutation of one’s experience of events such that one is at ease with what would otherwise be 
horrifying events. This is the manner in which virtue insulates the virtuous agent from the 
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requirement for external goods and renders his happiness immune to the possibility of 
misfortune. The concern which arises is that the distanced perspective involves a certain 
disconnection from the world which is a world in which bad things happen.  
I responded to this objection by arguing that the distanced perspective is compatible with 
appreciative experience of evil events. I argued for this by first showing that the distanced 
perspective is compatible with taking a higher perspective on the evils such that they lose 
their bite as it were. I argued that we are prima facie committed to this insofar as we are 
committed to the idea that the sage is someone who always acts in the best of manners which 
is seemingly incompatible with asking the sage to breakdown and despair in the face of even 
the greatest of misfortunes but rather to retain his composure and ease with all outcomes.  
There are numerous questions that have been left unanswered and possible objections that 
have  not been considered and responded to. One such objection that is worth just noting here 
is the concern that the understanding of wisdom articulated in this paper is incompatible with 
love. One may object that the person so described is not a person who will be able to love. I 
did not have the space to consider and respond to this objection. I however do feel that it is an 
objection that can be responded to. I in fact feel that it can be argued that the sage is one who 
illustrates love in its most transcendent form. If we are to think of love as a form of 
identification154 with the beloved then the sage does indeed seems to illustrate an immense 
and unrestricted love. We see in the universality of the thought present in the cosmic 
consciousness of the sage an identification of sorts. More precisely we see an identification 
with the cosmos. It seems plausible then that we can describe the cosmic consciousness of the 
sage as a love of the whole, namely a love which has no bounds and has transcended the love 
of particulars. This objection and its response clearly needs much greater and more thorough 
treatment than I can give it here so I must leave it for another project. 
Another question of significant interest is the question of whether a person who possesses 
wisdom in the sense developed in this paper is able to act. As noted in chapter 3 if such a 
person is to act it will be from some motivation other than desire. This then would be a form 
of action that differs from our ordinary understanding of what it means to act. I am the view 
that the action of such a person is a form of autotelic activity. Like the objection just noted 
                                                          
154 Love as it is described by Frankfurt (2001) 
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however I do not have the space to consider this question but must instead postpone it for 
another project. 
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